THE SUNG RESISTANCE MOVEMENT, 1276-1278: AN EPISODE IN CHINESE REGIONAL HISTORY

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A. Background and Interpretation

1. Introduction

When the capital Lin-an臨安 宋 fell to the Mongols in the early Spring of 1276 after protracted negotiations over its surrender,[1] much of Sung China (MAP 1) had already passed into the hands of the conquerors. The still unoccupied areas were expected to surrender to the new dynasty quickly and were in any case being rapidly overrun by Mongol horsemen and their Chinese allies advancing on several fronts.

The end had come after more than 40 years of chronic conflict with Mongol rulers of the North and nine years of almost continuous large scale positional warfare along both banks of the Yangtse, especially about much contested Hsiang-yang襄陽. There tenaciously defended Sung fortifications had barred the advance of the Mongol enemy for many years, seriously delaying the inevitable.[2]

The energies that had held Hsiang-yang, however, were exhausted by early 1276 and Sung field forces were scattered or destroyed. The imperial treasury was empty, and the state administrative and tax system charged with replenishing it was in disarray. The capital was virtually defenseless. To attempt to hold it any longer would have invited a Mongol massacre. The gates were opened and Marshal Bayan's troops marched in. The Sung dynasty seemed finished, its mandate passing to Mongol Yuan.

2. Resistance

Some loyalists nonetheless still refused to recognize the inescapable and planned a new Sung restoration, an attempted repeat of the highly successful achievement of a century and a half earlier.[3] Through their efforts resistance to the Mongols was prolonged for another three years and much of the Sung southeast-- the area now constituted by the provinces of Chiang-hsi, Fu-chien and Kuang-tung and Kuang-hsi-- was recovered momentarily by Sung forces to give the dynasty a brief new lease on life. The success of resistance leaders in achieving this in the face of tremendous obstacles was due above all to the largely untapped human and economic resources of the southeast loyalist base.

3. The Southeastern Power Base

At the time of the Sung Resistance Movement, the southeast was still very much *terra incognita* to most Chinese. Outside of a few commercially important centers such as Fu-chou福州 and Canton (Kuang-chou廣州) it was considered barbarian and undeveloped with little in common with most other Sung domains, focused on the large and economically sophisticated cities of the Yangtse.

Map One: The lu of Sung China

Politically and administratively incorporated into Chinese domains in Ch'in 秦 (220-206 BC) and Han 漢 (206 BC-220 AD) times,[5] the southeast had remained Chinese in name only and isolated from the rest of China for most of the next thousand years.

The isolation of the southeast, however, began to break down quickly from T'ang (618-906 AD) times on as Indian Ocean trade, for which Canton had long been a major entrepot, expanded rapidly.[6] This important development, coupled with the Southern Sung commercial and maritime orientation[7] and the concurrent emergence of a whole new regional agricultural and commodity exchange system based upon tea grown in the foothills of what is now Fu-chien and Chiang-hsi,[8] soon began to generate forces that were to change the character of the backward southeast completely and gradually make it into one of the richest and most advanced portions of China.

One result of the changes taking place, the emergence of the great ports of the southeast, was already completely evident to the Venetian Marco Polo. He described one of them, Ch'üan-chou (Zaiton), in the period just following the end of the Sung Resistance movement in the following exuberant terms:

> To turn now to other matters, you must know that when the traveller leaves Fu-chau [Fu-chou] he crosses the [Min-chiang 閩江] river and proceeds southeastwards for five days through a country full of well-built cities and towns and homesteads and rich in natural resources . . . At the end of the five days' journey lies the splendid city of Zaiton, at which is the port for all the ships that arrive from India laden with costly wares and precious stones of great price and big pearls of fine quality. It is also a port for the merchants of Manzi [the former Sung domains], that is, of all the surrounding territory, so that the total amount of traffic in gems and other merchandise entering the leaving this port is a marvel to behold. From this city and its ports goods are exported to the whole province of Manzi. And I assure you that for one spice ship that goes to Alexandria or elsewhere to pick up pepper for export of Christendom, Zaiton is visited by a hundred. For you must know that it is one of the two ports in the world with the biggest flow of merchandise.[9]

4. Non-Chinese Elements

Rapid economic and social change in the southeast (although only peaking during the Ch'ing, in the late eighteenth century, due to the overseas tea trade with Europe)[10] was thus already becoming clearly evident by the thirteenth century and was one major reason why Sung loyalists thought it possible to rebuild the dynasty based upon the southeast as an emerging region. But the old at that time had still by no means entirely given way to the new, and while the cities and towns of the southeast were flourishing and increasingly Chinese in character, much of the interior still remained unacculturated, inhabited by a great variety of aboriginal groups, some more sinicized than others. Many played an active role in the fight of the Sung loyalists against the Mongols. They thus participated, along with the Chinese and sinicized inhabitants of the cities and towns, in events of a new kind that were to have their own special impact upon all involved in them and upon the entire southeast.

Most important among the southeastern China aboriginal groups participating in the events of the Sung Resistance Movement were the peoples called She 畲 in the sources. The name comes from an old Chinese word for swidden agriculture, practiced by the She. They were, according to Hsü Sung-shih 徐松石, a local variety of Yao 猺 concentrated, in late Sung times, in what is now eastern Kuang-tung, eastern Kuang-hsi, southern Chiang-hsi and in the interior parts of Fu-chien, especially around T'ing-chou 汀州 and Chien-ning 建寧.[11] This distribution is largely confirmed by our sources.

During the resistance the She were an important source of local troops for the loyalists They used them to garrison towns, including Nan-en 南恩, on the southwestern coast of modern Kuang-tung,[12] as well as for offensive operations. The largest component of loyalist general Chang Shih-Chieh's 張世傑[13] expedition to recover Ch'uan-chou in the early summer of 1277 appears to have consisted of She troops, some led by a woman.[14] Another major loyalist commander, Wen T'ien-hsiang 文天祥, is repeatedly associated with the She and almost certainly used She troops for his invasions of Chiang-hsi in 1276 and 1277.[15] It is also highly probably that the loyalist army concentrated at Shao-wu 邵武 in what is now Fu-chien in the early summer of 1276 contained large numbers of She since Shao-wu was located in an area of She concentration.[16] She may also have played a role in the numerous uprisings in support of the loyalist cause within Chiang-hsi during 1276 and 1277.[17]

The reasons why the She took such an active role in resistance to the Mongols were many. That most She serving in the loyalist armies were probably forced inductees or mercenaries rather than free-will volunteers moved by the justice of the loyalist cause is probably a safe inference. There is even some indication of this in our sources.[18] Some, however, seem to have willingly chosen to serve the loyalists or followed leaders choosing the Sung side, underscoring what was apparently a long-term connection between the Sung regime and certain aboriginal groups of the south. But whatever their motivation for supporting the Sung cause, it is clear that the She were a very important element in the population mix of the Chinese southeast in the late thirteenth century and held the balance of power in many portions of the former Sung domains now fought over by Loyalist and Yuan armies. The special efforts later made by the Mongol conquerors to establish connections with them, and with many other south Chinese aboriginal groups as well, is clearly indicative of the relative power enjoyed by such groups in a region far more ethnically disparate then than now.

A second southeastern aboriginal group which participated actively in the Sung Resistance Movement was the Boat People, more commonly known by the derisive Cantonese expression Tanka (Tan-chia 蜑家, "hatched from eggs like reptiles"). The Boat People, still found in waters off the City of Hong Kong and the New Territories (in very rapidly diminishing numbers as more and more are forced to take up permanent residence on land), live on house boats and make a living by diving and fishing. They once occupied most of the off-shore areas and river mouths of what is now Kuang-tung, Kuang-hsi, Fu-chien and Che-chiang where they also cultivated new lands formed by alluvial action. The Boat People are believed by some to have once been mountain people who took to life on boats in late T'ang times, if not earlier, when they were pushed out of the mountains by other groups.[19]

The willing (as opposed to most of the She involved, for example) participation of Boat People in the Sung Resistance Movement is very well documented. Boat People flocked in numbers to the final Sung base at Yai-shan 厓山 (see MAP 4) in 1278. They formed the basis for an unsuccessful attempt to take and hold Canton (Kuang-chou 廣州) in 1279 to prevent the junction of two Yuan armies advancing upon the Sung fleet.[20] Boat People also rose in revolt in 1284-1285, long after the last Sung armies had been crushed, to support a man claiming to be a Sung prince.[21]

5. Local Militias

Aboriginal troops, however, only comprised a small part of the numerous local forces employed by the loyalists. In fact one noteworthy characteristic of the Sung Resistance Movement in general

was the extent to which it was supported by local armies, with a relatively small role played by Sung regulars. To some extent this may be have been due to the geographical focus of resistance in areas not heavily garrisoned by the Sung. But this fails to explain why regulars were little used when they were available. The answer, I suspect, lies in the resistance movement's nature as a last ditch stand of the Sung local elite with strong local connections among tenant farmers and the local population at large, the popularity of the Resistance cause among the people in many areas of the southeast (such as the Canton hinterland) and the at times questionable loyalty of regular troops. The latter were often demoralized by separation from home and their unfamiliarity with tropical China and its well-known hazards to health.

Local forces in the southeast, including many of the aboriginal units, seem already to have been organized into the *tung*峒, *hsiang*鄉 and *lu*路 militias well known from Ch'ing (1644-1911) sources.[22] Smallest of them were the locality militias mobilized from *tung*, comprised of one large or several smaller villages[23] or of an aboriginal group.[24] Next came the units drawn from *hsiang*, sub-county (*hsien*縣 or監 *chien*) political units existing at least since T'ang times.[25] Under the Sung they were closely associated with the *pao-chia* 保甲 system of mutual responsibility for violations of law (households were organized into units of 10, 100 and 1000 households with all individuals within any one unit responsible for the actions of all other members).[26]

In Sung times *hsiang*, as administrative units, were organized into *hsien*, "counties," and *chien*, "industrial counties," *hsien* and *chien* into *fu* 府, "prefectures," and *fu* in turn were loosely grouped into *lu*路, "circuits."[27] *Lu* militia forces were thus, in theory, unlike those drawn from *tung* and *hsiang* regional units.[28] However, the bureaucratic analogy must not be pressed too closely since there is evidence that the militia and administrative systems did not correspond exactly. In Ch'ing times, for example, the organization of local militias was largely para-governmental and had little or no connection with the official administrative structure.[29]

Not all militia units, however, were associated with the three-level structure described above. Another type of popular force was raised by members of the gentry or local elite, while many supposedly independent local units may in fact have been raised under strong elite influence. One example of such personal forces is provided by the biography of Ch'en Tsan陳璸 in the *Fu-chien t'ung-chi*福建通紀, which mentions that he raised a small number of troops from among the members of his own "household."[30] Some aboriginal units may have been raised on the great gentry estates (*chuang-yuan*莊園) as well.

6. The Awakening of a Region

The Sung Resistance Movement marked the first time in Chinese history that the southeast, of growing economic and political importance but still culturally backward, played an active role in national events. For this reason and because of the participation in the movement of broad cross sections of the local population, both Chinese and non-Chinese, the events associated with Sung resistance have left their indelible impression upon local traditions, and the memory of them has remained strong to the present, not only in the southeast itself,[31] but among Cantonese and other southeast China migrants to the New World and their descendants.[32]

Participation of an ancestor in the Sung Resistance Movement became a source of pride for later generations throughout the region and the movement itself has provided symbols that all inhabitants of the Southeast, Chinese and non-Chinese, can identify with. As a consequence the Sung Resistance Movement has helped promote identification with national values, regional integration and the process of sinicization in the once largely unassimilated and isolated southeast.

The examples of heroic determination and resistance to oppression set by the Sung loyalists of the late 13th century in the southeast have found many echoes in the later history of the region, most notably in the association of the Canton Delta with the events of 1911 and the succeeding reestablishment of Republicanism in the 1920s.[33] That it was a man of Hsiang-shan hsien香山縣, born not far from the site of the last climactic battle between the Sung fleet and the Mongols, who was to lead the movement resulting in the overthrow of Manchu rule and the beginning of a new era in Chinese history was no accident. Sun Yat-sen孫中山 was in every way a successor to the leaders of the Sung resistance, built up his movement in a region that they helped create as a self-conscious unit, and often thought and spoke using the images of the movement.

The Sung Resistance Movement of 1276-1279 thus marked in many ways the coming of age of an important region of China, the final emergence of the peoples of the far coastal south into the mainstream of Chinese history. It is for this reason of interest both as an episode in Sung and Yuan history and as a key event in the regional history of the southeast, and in particular of the Canton Delta, where events were concentrated. It is also noteworthy due to the light the movement casts upon many facets of medieval Chinese history that would otherwise remain obscure. These include the relationships of the elite and its administrative structure to aboriginal groups, sub-county (*tung* and *hsiang*) political structure, local military organization, the whole mechanism of restoration at a time of crisis and regional social and economic history.

7. Periodization and Character of Events

The events of the Sung Resistance Movement fell into three well-defined phases. During the first phase, lasting from the late Spring of 1276 until the end of that year, loyalist forces had their main base in what is now Fu-chien and drew their support primarily from that area while attempting to organize a general resistance throughout the southeast and adjacent regions. During the second phase, lasting from the end of 1276 to early 1278, the resistance movement was based upon Kuang-tung, although fighting was by no means confined there. In the final phase, early 1278 to the early Spring of 1279, the loyalists moved first to what is now the province of Kuang-hsi but finally returned to Kuang-tung. Each phase was marked by an initial loyalist expansion of influence, Mongol counterattack and then the collapse of the loyalist position. Twice the loyalists were reduced to little more than their fleet, and in the end this fleet itself was destroyed, only a score of ships escaping in a vain attempt to continue the struggle.

While their movement was not ultimately a success, the ability of the Sung loyalists to continue their resistance for almost three years and to survive near total defeat on two occasions is nonetheless impressive. There are a number of explanations for their staying power. Foremost was the ability of the local Sung elite of the southeast to often mobilize their every resource in battles to the death against the Mongol conquerors. Here the strict subordination of local systems to the elite, above all through elite controlled tenant farming, seems to have stood the Sung cause in good stead at the time of crisis.

However, an assumption of strict Sung elite control of the regional societies of the southeast alone cannot explain the ability of the Sung resistance movement to sustain itself so well for so long, often long after the local elite itself had given up the cause or had simply come to lack the means for effective mobilization of local resources in a ravaged land. Ultimately it was the continued popularity of the movement

itself, despite repeated defeats, that sustained the movement. The Sung cause continued, in fact, to be popular in the southeast long after the final defeat of Sung loyalist armies there in 1279, as witnessed by the many popular uprisings that took place in the region in the name of the Sung cause well into the fourteenth century. Loyalist leaders, for example, by and large experienced little difficulty in raising popular armies to fight the Mongol invaders, particularly in the Canton area.

Another reason for the longevity of the Sung resistance movement were the severe tactical problems which widespread resistance created for the Mongols, who had to deal not with just one but with scores of restoration armies. Finally, the Mongols twice made the error of destroying loyalist forces on the land but of allowing the loyalist fleet to escape and serve as a basis for new resistance. In addition, southeastern China was not the only portion of the new Yuan empire requiring urgent military action. The collapse of the Yuan front in Central Asia in 1277, which threatened the very survival of the Mongol regime in Khanbaliq,[34] and other rebellions unrelated to the resistance movement, drew away Mongol forces and, however briefly, gave the loyalists a free hand in many areas.

The ultimate failure of the attempted restoration of 1276-1279 is attributable to the nature of the opposition that it faced, the comparatively restricted resource base available to resistance leaders, the poor military strategy and planning of the loyalists, splits within their ranks and a carefully managed Mongol policy of ruthless suppression of resistance combined with openhandedness to all those submitting willingly to their rule. Each of these elements had its impact upon loyalist fortunes and together they spelled ultimate and total failure for the resistance. Conditions in 1276 simply did not favor a repeat of the success achieved in 1125-7.

First of all, the Mongol Yuan dynasty was an antagonist of a totally different character from the relatively primitive Jurched (later founders of the Chin 金 Dynasty),[35] who had threatened the Sung state's survival at the beginning of the twelfth century. Unlike that of the Jurched, the Mongol assault against the Sung was a well-planned, well coordinated and deliberate campaign carried out by an integrated state organized in the Chinese manner. Also unlike the Jurched, who could invade but learned to conquer and exploit only gradually and with difficulty, the Mongols came fully prepared to exploit their conquests. The fortified towns of the south which had blunted the advance of the Jurched in 1125-7, and later confined them to positions well north of the Yangtse and Huai River defense lines of the Sung, slowed but could not prevent the advance of the Mongols, who controlled armies organized in the Chinese style, and hence were fully capable of assaulting and taking a town. Moreover, whereas the Jurched were inferior to the Sung in most aspects of military technology in 1125-7, the Mongols by the late thirteenth century had a military technology[36] equal if not superior to what their opponents could offer. The Mongols, for example, had found manifold uses for gunpowder, which enabled them to reduce with ease cities that the Jurched had been unable to take. The Mongols had also, by the 1270s, created riverine and coastal fleets (but not yet an ocean-going fleet, to the great embarrassment of Mongol armies operating in the southeast) to negate Sung water barriers and turn their flanks. The Jurched, on the other hand, had been very unsuccessful when meeting the Sung on water.

Mongol military strategy was also far superior to Sung. If there was any one single reason for the failure of the Sung Resistance Movement it was the almost total reliance of Sung loyalist forces upon traditional positional warfare in the face of Mongol mobile strategy.[37] The fundamental difference between the military approaches of the two protagonist groups was nowhere better illustrated than by their respective dispositions in the final, climactic Battle of Yai-shan, in the early Spring of 1279. There a greatly superior Sung fleet of over one thousand large ocean-going junks, in addition to a multitude of smaller vessels, was totally defeated by a Mongol fleet of no more than 500 much smaller vessels. The Sung ships had given up their mobility by anchoring to form a rectangular "water-fortress," each ship tied to its neighbors by large ropes. The Mongols, on the other hand, used their mobility to the maximum extent possible under the circumstances (Sung commanders selected the site to limit possible avenues of attack; see the detailed discussion below) and defeated the loyalist forces in detail. Other examples might be cited.

Faulty strategy might have been overcome, in some instances at least, if there had been strong and effective loyalist leadership. Disagreements and rifts among loyalist generals, however, seriously damaged their cause and prevented coordinated resistance to the invaders. Most serious was the continuing dispute between Wen T'ien-hsiang, the paragon of loyalism to later generations and possibly the best military mind in the restoration camp, and Chang Shih-chieh, who, together with the slightly unstable scholar Ch'en I-chung 陳宜中,[38] another of Wen's opponents, dominated the loyalist government. The ultimate origin of the hard feelings between Wen and Chang seems to have been feelings on the part of Chang and Ch'en that Wen was an upstart, a johnny-come-lately with an inflated sense of his own importance.[39] It is also clear, however, that a more immediate cause of conflict between Chang and Wen during the years of the resistance itself was their disagreement as to what overall strategy should be pursued. Wen favored concentration on efforts to secure the interior of the Sung southeast, above all his native Chiang-hsi, as a first step toward restoring Sung. Chang, on the other hand, favored a strategy based upon control of the coastal cities, from which he hoped to dominate the interior.

In the end no compromise was possible between these opposing viewpoints and each loyalist commander fought his own war. Wen advanced into Chiang-hsi and Chang operated from Fu-chou and later from various points on the coast of Kuang-tung. There was only minimal cooperation between them. This state of affairs persisted throughout the three years of resistance, even during the final phases when both men fought from Kuang-tung. The degree to which such a lack of cooperation eased the task of the Mongols can be well imagined and the rift between Wen and Chang was by no means the only one within the loyalist camp.

The Mongol pacification policy also created serious uncertainties within loyalist ranks and undermined their position on more than one occasion. Traditionally, the Mongols had exterminated those who resisted (and thereby offended Heaven, which had empowered the Mongols to conquer the world), but honored those submitting. This policy was used to much effect against the Sung. The populations of Kuang-tung cities such as Ch'ao-chou 潮州 or Shao-chou 韶州, which resisted with too much vigor, as will be seen below, were massacred along with their garrisons. Sung generals and officials who surrendered quickly, on the other hand, or who put up only nominal resistance, were commonly restored to their offices as agents of the Yuan or were given equivalent posts elsewhere. One famous example among Sung turncoats who profited from a quick surrender was P'u Shou-keng 蒲壽庚,[40] the powerful Sung superintendent of Maritime Customs (*shih-po shih* 市舶使).[41] P'u not only retained his old position but ultimately increased his powers. There were many other examples. The choice was plain to many Sung generals, officials and local leaders: Either surrender and be honored, or face annihilation if resistance (often deemed suicidal anyway) failed. Some surrendered, and others continued to resist despite the dangers of failure, but the

Mongol policy of rewarding those who surrendered meant that resistance leaders could never rely on the total and undivided support of their base areas.

8. The Sources

The sources used in this study were varied and very uneven in quality. They encompass standard histories, i.e. the *Sung shih* 宋史 ("Official History of the Sung Dynasty") and *Yuan shih* 元史 ("Official History of the Yuan Dynasty"), local gazeteers (*fang-chih* 方志), various unoffical histories, including the *Hsü tz'u-chih t'ung-chien* 續資治通鑑 "Continuation of the 'Comprehensive Mirror for Governing'") by Pi Yuan 畢沅(1729-1797), unofficial biographies, some fragments of the *Ching-shih ta-tien* 經世大典, the great imperial encyclopaedia of the Yuan Dynasty, literary remains of loyalist generals and ministers[42] and a genealogy. Most accessible but not necessarily the most useful were the standard histories and the *Hsü tz'u-chih t'ung-chien*. Since such works are, however, compilations of earlier material made long after the events described. They (particularly the official sources) often contain major errors of fact due to the limitations and prejudices of the works from which they were drawn. Moreover, neither the compilers of the standard histories nor Pi Yuan seem to have made much use of the many loyalist surviving histories and other sources. These include the *Yai-shan chi* 厓山集 ("Yai-shan Record"), a late Ming compilation of fragments of the now lost early Ming work, *Yai-shan chih* 厓山志 ("Yai-shan Monograph"), written by the Kuang-tung loyalist scholar Chang Hsü 張翔 and incorporating many loyalist traditions still current in the author's time in his native province but not found in other sources. The *Yai-shan chi* has proven to be the most reliable of all the sources containing accounts of the Sung Resistance Movement used in this study. Its only deficiency is the relative paucity of information on events in Chiang-hsi, which are fortunately well covered in other sources, including the various biographies of Wen T'ien-hsiang and his supporters.

Other important loyalist sources include the *Ch'ung-hsiu yai-shan chi* 重修厓山志 of Huang Ch'un 黃淳, a detailed and thorough revision of the *Yai-shan Chi*, the *Erh-wang pen-mo* ("Full History of the Two Princes"), an early Yuan sequel to the late Sung *San ch'ao cheng-yao* 三朝政要("Essentials of the Regimes of Three Courts") by Ch'en Cheng-wei 陳仲微(1212-1283) and the *Chao chung lu* 昭忠錄("Record of Shining Loyalty"), a short biographically oriented account of the late Sung resistance to the Mongols that is likewise a product of early Yuan times but which represents a totally different tradition than that of other loyalist sources. Also representing its own tradition of great value is the Kuang-tung Chao 趙 genealogy *Chao-shih tsu-p'u* 趙氏族譜 ("Genealogical Record of the Chao Clan").

Discrepancies between the sources, confusion and even outright contradictions were many and not all were resolvable. Serious ideological differences from one source to the other were always evident and had to be taken into consideration. There was conflict in the sources not only in terms of varying Yuan and Sung loyalist evaluations of the Resistance Movement as a whole but also within the loyalist sources themselves, regarding the disputed role of Wen T'ien-hsiang, for example.

Available secondary literature was not very useful since much of it concentrates on Sung literati loyalists (*Sung i-min* 宋遺民), i.e. those scholars refusing to serve the new Yuan dynasty and adopting other means of intellectual protest who took no direct part in the armed resistance to the Mongols and are thus beyond the scope of this study.[43] Except for Lo Hsiang-lin's 羅香林 short and very uncritical "Sung wang-t'ai yü Sung Li-chih hai-shang hsing-ch'ao" 宋王台與宋末之海山行朝,[44] and the even briefer summary in Franke's *Geschichte des chinesischen Reiches*,[45] there exists no published general account of the Sung Resistance Movement.

Books on the subject in Chinese have dealt by and large only with specialized topics such as the exact route followed by the Sung fleet carrying the two pretenders,[46] or the role played by the area that is now the Crown Colony of Hong Kong in the resistance,[47] most often in a highly uncritical manner. The few journal articles on the subject are even more specialized and frequently even less critical.

There are numerous popular biographies of resistance leaders such as Chang Shih-chieh, and especially Wen T'ien-hsiang, but most were written as Nationalist political propaganda rather than as serious historical essays, and are not of much use for historians. These deficiencies in the available Chinese-language secondary scholarship are doubly unfortunate since Japanese and Western scholars appear to have taken very little interest in the Sung Resistance Movement, in spite of the movement's importance for the history of Southeastern China and the variety of interesting and useful (if difficult and large unevaluated) source material available. It is hoped that the publication of the present study (which is intended as no more than a preliminary examination of a complex topic) will stimulate the further interest that the topic richly deserves.

In the pages that follow I have attempted to outline the major events of the resistance in general rather than specific terms, leaving the many specialized problems involved with the sources and with the resistance movement itself for another day. Social and economic background has also not been discussed in any detail, although certain facets of this background necesssary to understand the events of the movement are presented. The study focuses on the court and on resistance activities in what is now the province of Kuang-tung, where the most important events of the movement took place, and which has been an area of long term interest to the present author.[48] An earlier version of this study was presented in 1971 to members of the University of Washington Canton Delta Seminar and I would like to thank the members of the seminar and its directors, Professors Winston Hsieh and John Brim, for their expert guidance, encouragement and the many suggestions offered for the improvement of the study.

B. The Events of the Movement

1. Escape of the Princes and Operations in Fu-chien

Various plans for continued resistance and an eventual Sung restoration were in the air as Mongol forces moved closer to Lin-an. It was Wen T'ien-hsiang, a major prop of the court in those last days, who first proposed that Princes Shih 昰 and Ping 昺, young offspring of Emperor Tu-tsung 度宗 (r. 1265-1275), the penultimate Sung ruler in Lin-an, by minor consorts,[49] be sent to guard Kuang 廣 and Min 閩, i.e. the Modern Kuang-tung and Fu-chien.[50] Although the proposal was not then accepted, the two princes were allowed to leave the palace for the first time.[51] Later, as the danger grew and the fall of the capital seemed imminent, members of the imperial family renewed the request and Empress Mother Hsieh 謝[52] agreed. Shih and Ping were both given office, Shih as *I-wang* 益王 ("Prince producing benefit") *p'an fu-chien chien fu-chien an-fu ta shih* 判福建兼安撫大使("Deciding Officer for Fu-chien and jointly Great Fu-chien Pacification Commissioner"), and Ping as *Kuang-wang* 廣王 ("Spacious Prince") *p'an ch'üan-chou chien p'an nan wai-tsung cheng* 判泉州兼判南外宗正("Deciding Officer for Ch'üan-chou and jointly Chief of the Southern Exterior Imperial Clan"). The latter office conferred authority over all Chao clansmen in the south excepting the members of the immediate imperial family.[53] The titles chosen clearly indicate the planned role of Fu-chien and its great port Ch'üan-chou in the hoped for future restored Sung regime. Various advisors drawn from the maternal

relatives of the two princes were also appointed at the same time.[54]

The two princes and their escorts left Lin-an even as Mongol cavalry appeared under its walls. They moved down the Ch'ien-t'ang River towards Wu-chou 婺州, to the south of the capital. There they were overtaken by Sung turncoat general Fan Wen-hu,[55] now serving the Mongols. Fan had been sent by Marshal Bayan in pursuit of the Sung refugees and sent envoys to the party to order them to return. The princes and their followers, however, refused to submit and moved on, leaving behind the imperial son-in-law (*fu-ma*駙馬) Yang Chen楊鎮, who bravely volunteered to fight a rear guard action in which he lost his life. The Sung party then took to the nearby hills on foot and remained safely concealed for a week until Sung commander Chang Ch'uan張全, leading a score of soldiers, found them. Chang conducted the refugees to Yung-chia永嘉 on the coast, where they crossed the Yun-ho River to the comparative safety of Wen-chou溫州 (MAP 2), still in Sung hands. Their arrival in Wen-chou is dated to the third intercalary month (April 16 to May 14, 1276), some weeks after the occupation of Lin-an by the Mongols.[56]

News of the escape of the two princes soon spread. Su Liu-i蘇劉義,[57] who had taken up position with his troops near Wen-chou shortly before the fall of Lin-an, met the princes as they entered Wen-chou, and offered his services. His move was quickly seconded by the brilliant Lu Hsiu-fu陸秀夫,[58] who was to contribute considerable organizational talents to the renewed Sung cause and who hurried to Wen-chou from his home at Ch'u-chou to support it. At Lu's suggestion a summons was sent to Chang Shih-chieh, who soon arrived with his troops and ships from Ting-hai定海, a major naval base guarding the sea approaches to Lin-an, and another to Ch'en I-chung, who came from the nearby anchorage of Ch'ing-ao清澳 with his forces. Like Su, both Chang and Ch'en had earlier withdrawn from the capital with their troops when it had become apparent that the Empress-Mother intended to surrender rather than stand a siege, Chang after first suggesting that the court be taken on board ship to continue the fight.[59]

At the Chiang-hsin ssu江心寺 Temple in Wen-chou there remained an old imperial throne, left-over from the days of Emperor Kao-tsung (r.1127-1163), who had fled to Wen-chou at the beginning of his own restoration. Seated on this throne, Prince Shih was acclaimed Commander-in-chief of the Horse and Foot of the Empire (*t'ien-hsia ping ma tu yuan-shuai*天下兵馬都元帥) by weeping courtiers and supporters. Prince Shih's younger brother, Prince Ping, was appointed the new emperor's assistant. The first steps were taken to establish a government, troops were enlisted and edicts sent to Fu-chien calling upon the officials and population there to resist the Mongols.[60] When this had been done, two eunuchs and eight soldiers sent by the Empress-Mother to recall the two young princes at the behest of her new Mongol masters were drowned in the Yun-ho River by Ch'en I-chung. The intentions of the loyalists were now plain to all.[61]

Some time during the same third intercalary month the princes and their court left Wen-chou and sailed to Fu-chou福州 in what is now Fu-chien. This port city was to remain their base for almost the entire first phase of the resistance. The court, moreover, arrived in its new headquarters none too soon, since it is evident that only their stabilizing presence prevented the quick loss of the entire region. Important garrisons at T'ing-chou and Chien-ning 建寧, guarding the approaches from Chiang-hsi, had been on the point of surrendering to the former Sung general Huang Wan-shih黃萬世, now gone over to the Yuan. Backed by Mongol armies advancing down the Kan贛 River basin towards Kuang-tung, Huang had hoped to make a quick sweep of Sung Fu-chien to raise his own stock with the new dynasty. With the arrival of the Sung princes, however, resistance hardened at both T'ing-chou and Chien-ning and Huang's forces



were repulsed by reinforcements sent from Nan-chien 南劍. Strategically positioned Shao-wu 邵武 --a potential base for a counterattack into Chiang-hsi-- was recovered during the same operation.[62] The repulse of Huang's army improved Fu-chien's immediate security but further measures would be quickly needed if a climate favorable to a continuation of the war with the Mongols was to be created throughout the region.[63]

To this end active preparations were made to conduct offensive as well as defensive military operations, and envoys were sent to nearly all surrounding areas still under Sung control calling upon their populations to rise and aid the state. To gain time, Ch'en I-chung conducted a clever psychological campaign by spreading the rumor that a Sung counterattack along the Yangtse had cut off all Yuan armies operating in the south. The rumor was widely believed by nervous Mongol commanders and nearly caused the precipitate withdrawal of one Yuan force that had penetrated as far as western Kuang-tung from the Mongol southwestern base area in Yun-nan.[64] Resistance now began to stiffen everywhere, piecemeal surrenders decreased in number, supporters began to flock to the loyalist cause and several attempts were made to intercept the train of the former Sung rulers of Lin-an, then moving north towards Mongol captivity.[65] The final step in the initial consolidation of the loyalist position was taken on June 14, 1276,[66] when Prince Shih was formally established as emperor and the year period changed from Te-yu 德祐 to Ching-yen 景炎. The attempted restoration had begun.

Serious military operations began in July, with movements west and north. Chao Chin 趙孟晉, appointed *Chiang-hsi chih-chih shih* 江西制置使 ("Regulating Official for Chiang-hsi"), was ordered to lead an army to reinforce Shao-wu 邵武, block the immediate line of Mongol advance from Chiang-hsi and prepare a counter offensive.[67] Separate forces led by Li Shih-kuei 李師夔, Fang Hsing 方興 and Chang Te 張德 were dispatched into Che-tung 浙東.[68] But even as these movements were being carried out, conflict was developing within loyalist ranks.

Wen T'ien-hsiang, hearing of the flight of the Sung princes, had suddenly appeared at Wen-chou in late May after a harrowing escape from Mongol captors. He had been taken prisoner during peace negotiations before Lin-an. Wen had steadfastly refused to surrender Sung sovereignty and had made an open threat of continued resistance if the Mongols attempted to extinguish Sung. Notifying the new court, which had already sailed to Fu-chou, of his presence and willingness to serve, Wen was summoned to the new capital shortly after the accession of Prince Shih and arrived at loyalist headquarters on the ninth of July, 1276.[69] He soon came into conflict with Chang Shih-chieh and Ch'en I-chung, now the dominant forces in the loyalist camp. Shortly after the accession of Prince Shih as emperor, Ch'en had been appointed *tso ch'eng-hsiang chien shu-mi shih tu-tu chu lu chun-ma* 左丞相兼樞密使都督諸路軍馬("Senior Minister and jointly Commissioner of Military Affairs in Overall Supervison of the Armies of the Various *lu*") and Chang *shu-mi fu shih* 樞密副使("Deputy Commissioner of Military Affairs"), giving the two joint control over the civil and military branches of the new Sung government.[70]

The reappearance of such an influential figure as Wen within the loyalist camp created an immediate problem of precedence. This difficulty was probably the main reason that Wen was left to cool his heals in Wen-chou for almost a month while the loyalist government was being organized in Fu-chou with Ch'en I-chung at its head. Shortly after his arrival Wen was offered the post of *yu ch'eng-hsiang chien shu-mi shih tu-tu chu lu chun-ma* 右丞相兼樞密使都督諸路軍馬("Junior Minister and jointly Commissioner of Military Affairs in Overall Supervison of the Armies of the Various *lu*"), making him in theory second in the loyalist government to Ch'en I-chung.

Wen, however, rejected this appointment, since "all court business was being decided by Ch'en I-chung and his [Wen's] advice was by and large not being followed." Wen also had his disagreements with Chang Shih-chieh and as a result Wen requested a field appointment and was given office as *shu-mi shih t'ung tu-tu chu lu chun-ma* 樞密使同都督諸路軍馬("Military Commissioner Assisting in Overall Supervison of the Armies of the Various *lu*"), a military office that left Wen out of the loyalist civilian government entirely and allowed him to take the field. He established a headquarters in Nan-chien 南劍 on August 15, 1276.[71]

The exact nature of the conflict between Wen, Ch'en and Chang is not spelled out in detail in our sources. Clearly, however, much more was involved than simple precedence within the loyalist government, since there is clear evidence that Ch'en and Chang made every effort to keep any effective power out of Wen's hands (perhaps out of fear that overhasty action by Wen might endanger a still fragile position in Fu-chien). Wen was not, for example, sent to back up Chao Chin, in spite of Wen's obvious influence in his home region of Chiang-hsi, where Chao was to conduct his operations. Moreover, when the loyalist government attempted to establish connections with potential allies in Huai-hsi *lu*, it did so behind Wen's back, Ch'en refusing to believe Wen's appraisal of the local situation. The result was that the garrison commander in T'ung-chou 通州 refused to credit an embassy from the loyalist government without a cover letter from Wen and surrendered to the Yuan authorities. This meant the loss by the loyalists of a large area without a fight.[72] Wen, on the other hand, was a continued source of irritation, with his free criticism of Ch'en, whom he castigated for his timid measures and failure to establish the authority of the new Sung regime. He also made it plain that he had little confidence in the capacity of Chang Shih-chieh's troops to defend the Sung cause.[73]

At the root of the conflict between the three loyalist ministers, however, seems to have been Wen's distrust of Chang's maritime, coastal strategy and Wen's wish to set about recovering the interior, including his native Chiang-hsi, as quickly as possible.[74] In hind sight Wen's view was clearly correct, since each passing day reduced loyalist chances of ever securing Chiang-hsi and other interior regions for their cause --without which the coastal areas could not be held, as Ch'en and Chang were soon to discover-- and swift and resolute action might have considerably enhanced a precarious Sung position. As it was, by the time that loyalist armies were ready to strike into Chiang-hsi in force, their main line of advance from Shao-wu had already been blocked by Li Heng's 李恆[75] hurried occupation of Chien-ch'ang 建昌.[76] Further south, Li's subordinates thwarted another line of loyalist advance by defeating the loyalist commander Wu Chun 吳浚 near Nan-feng 南豐, turning back the first loyalist invasion of southern Chiang-hsi.[77] Moreover, Wu's defeat also doomed an apparently successful penetration of the eastern Chiang hsi (Chiang tung-lu 江東路) and adjacent areas of Che-tung as well.[78]

The arrival of Li Heng's army, and loyalist reverses in southern Chiang-hsi and elsewhere were clear signs that, in spite of initial sucesses, time was running out. During the late Spring and Summer, Yuan policy towards the Sung resistance had been one of containment, using available forces, including those commanded by Li Heng, to hold a perimeter, and block further loyalist expansion. Such a policy was unavoidable in view of the still fluid nature of Yuan control in the south. Much of the interior of the formerly Sung domains still remained unpacified, even though the larger cities had been taken. Many Sung strong points on the Yangtse also continued to hold out, creating supply and communications problems for Mongol commanders. By the early Autumn the pressure on limited Yuan forces had eased considerably. As a result, the Yuan

government in Khanbaliq, by now fully cognizant of the extent of the opposition that it faced in the southeast, began to organize meaningful countermeasures to suppress the loyalists and complete the conquest of the south.

At the beginning of the ninth lunar month (October 9 to November 7) it was decided that forces under Li Heng (in Chiang-hsi) would cooperate with those under the Mongol general Alaqan (A-la-han 阿剌罕)[79] and under Tung Wen-ping 董文炳[80] (in Che-tung-lu) and launch a simultaneous attack on the loyalists from several directions. However, before this plan could be put into effect, Li proposed instead that his troops advance into Kuang-tung to prevent the loyalists from regrouping there once they had been denied Fu-chien, and to insure that southern Chiang-hsi would not be lost should his armies become engaged in Fu-chien. The proposal, which was fully reasonable in view of the gains that loyalist forces had already made in Kuang-tung (see below) and the gathering of a new army in central Fu-chien under Wen T'ien-hsiang, was accepted by Alaqan and Tung.[81] They then prepared to carry out their part of the plan. It involved a land and sea movement upon southern Che-tung and Fu-chien. The role originally intended for Li Heng, the landward assault on Fu-chien from Chiang-hsi, was now assigned to the Mongol A'urugci (Ao-lu-ch'ih 奥魯赤).[82]

Tung Wen-ping appears to have been positioned just south of the former Sung capital of Lin-an in October of 1276 when he began his advance. Tung had already come into contact with loyalist forces in late September, when he had relieved Wu-chou on the 23rd after a two day assault led by the Hsiu-wang [Chao] Yü-che 秀王[趙]與訔.[83] Tung advanced first to T'ai-chou, to force the withdrawal of Sung forces stationed there by Chang Shih-chieh, perhaps to block Yuan naval movements, and clear the way for a Yuan coastal fleet under Alaqan.[84] He then marched to Wen-chou through Ch'u-chou 處州. There he rendezvoused with Alaqan. Wen-chou fell after a hard battle between Tung's army and the Hsiu-wang [Chao] Yu-che fought outside the city on December 20, 1276.[85] Even as Tung closed in on loyalist forces in Wen-chou, Alaqan sailed south to threaten the loyalist capital.

Chang Shih-chieh marshaled his fleet along the coast and prepared for a battle with Alaqan.[86] But the situation was already hopeless for Sung forces in Fu-chou due to A'urugci's advance from Chiang tung-lu. The Mongol general had entered Fu-chien through the famous Sha-kuan 杉關 Pass. This strategic position that had apparently been left ungarrisoned by the Loyalist armies. Moving swiftly, he took Shao-wu, Nan-chien, Chien-ning and moved on towards Fu-chou, breaking up loyalist forces in the area that had been concentrated for an invasion of northern Chiang-hsi.[87]

Pressed on all sides the loyalist position in Fu-chien began to crumble. There had already been mutinies in Chang-chou 漳州 and Hsing-hua chun 興化軍 during the early Autumn, just as Yuan forces were preparing to invade.[88] Many local leaders, officials and generals in Fu-chien now began to have second thoughts about supporting the Restoration as Yuan armies approached. Indecision gripped the minds of Ch'en I-chung, Chang Shih-chieh and other loyalist leaders. Thus the planned naval battle outside of Fu-chou never took place and instead the loyalist ministers took the young emperor and his brother on board on December 21, and three days later set sail for Ch'üan-chou. They took with them on their ships some 170,000 regulars (including 10,000 elite Huai bodyguard troops) and 300,000 militia, but abandoned Fu-chou to its fate. The town may in any case have been indefensible due to earthquake damaged walls.[89] The Yuan fleet, after a brief encounter with the withdrawing Sung ships, anchored near the city, taken by A-la-han without a fight on December 29. He was soon joined by Tung Wen-ping and A'urugci. All quickly went in pursuit of the fleeing loyalists.[90]

Ch'üan-chou, their destination, was the private empire of P'u Shou-keng, a man of Persian origins who controlled the lucrative maritime customs income of the great southeastern port. His loyalties were questionable.[91] When the loyalist fleet arrived, P'u immediately went to pay his respects and requested that the two princes come on shore and place themselves under his protection. This proposal alarmed Chang Shih-chieh, who already distrusted P'u, and the princes remained on board ship. Relations rapidly deteriorated, and the suspicions of the loyalists grew further when P'u refused to supply the Sung fleet.[92] Faced with this refusal, the loyalists prepared to sail on to Kuang-tung, but first, taking advantage of their strength, they plundered the property of P'u, which was considerable, and seized some of his ships to expand their fleet.[93] P'u was enraged, and it is said, though there is good reason to doubt the tradition,[94] slaughtered all the members of the Chao clan that he could find and any Huai regulars stationed in Ch'üan-chou.[95] The break complete, the loyalists set sail and P'u prepared to surrender to the Mongols, much to their surprise. Tung Wen-ping's army entered the city on January 13, 1277.[96] To ensure P'u's further usefulness and loyalty to the new regime, Tung "loosened the golden tiger tally which he himself wore and hung it on P'u," thereby reinstating him in his position and authority in Ch'üan-chou.[97] P'u Shou-keng was to prove a most useful ally to the Mongols. Fu-chien was now lost to the loyalists. Only scattered islands of resistance remained as the princes sailed south to a new base in Kuang-tung.

2. Resistance in Kuang-tung

When the loyalist fleet anchored at Ch'ao-chou in Kuang-tung in the early part of 1277, they found a situation little better than the one they had left behind them in Fu-chien. Most of Kuang-tung was already in Mongol hands, despite spirited local efforts to save the *lu* for the loyalists, and the chances of recovering lost ground seemed slight.

Kuang-tung had originally surrendered to the Mongols in the early summer of 1276. Kuang-tung military intendant (*Kuang-nan ching-lüeh-shih* 廣南經略使) Hsü Chih-liang 徐直諒, aware that the capital had fallen, and threated by Mongol advances into Chiang-hsi, Hu-nan and Kuang-hsi,[98] had sent his general Liang Hsiung-fei 梁雄飛 to Lung-hsing 隆興 in Chiang-hsi to negotiate a surrender with the Uighur Ariq-qaya.[99] Ariq-qaya, who held overall responsibility for operations in the far and middle south of the Sung empire, had accepted the surrender, appointed Liang a pacification commissioner (*chao-t'ao shih* 招討使), and sent him back, along with Huang Shih-hsiung 黃世傑. Liang was to oversee the area pending the establishment of a regular Yuan administration.[100]

Upon his return, however, Liang and his Yuan lieutenant found a very different situation than he or his new master Ariq-qaya had anticipated. Hsü Chih-liang had received word of Prince Shih's establishment in Fu-chou, and had decided, perhaps at the urging of powerful local figures, to support the loyalist cause. Hsü sent ships and troops to guard the Shih-men 石門 barrier, just north of the city of Canton,[101] and resist Liang. The volunteer river force led by Li Hsing-tao 李性道, however, failed to support the land forces ably led by Huang Chun 黃俊, and the loyalist position quickly collapsed. Liang Hsiung-fei continued his advance and took Canton on July 25, 1276, after Hsü Chih-liang had abandoned the city. Once Canton, the major city of the region, had been taken, the rest of Kuang-tung soon submitted.[102]

Opposition to Liang's *coup de main*, however, soon developed in the eastern Canton delta, and spread rapidly. Leader of the new resistance was the commoner Hsiung Fei 熊飛, from the village of Liu-hua ts'un 柳花村 in Tung-huan hsien 東莞縣.[103] Hsiung was a man of military proclivities, according to his

biography, who had taken an active role in organizing local militia units in Kuang-tung as the Yuan threat to Sung grew.[104] When the restoration was first proclaimed, Hsiung, his biographer informs us, had made preparations to join loyalist armies being organized by Wen T'ien-hsiang. The Yuan occupation of Canton prevented him from carrying out his plan. Instead Hsiung "feigned submission" and was put in charge of Ch'ao-chou and Hui-chou 惠州 by Huang Shih-chieh.[105]

An opportunity to join loyalist forces, however, soon presented itself, as the loyalist general Chao Chin, unsuccessful in his efforts against Chiang-hsi, moved into Kuang-tung and towards Ch'ao-chou in early October. Establishing contact with Chao, Hsiung secretly withdrew his troops by boat to his home in Tung-huan hsien and began enlisting still larger forces to support Chao Chin's operations and the Sung cause. In mid-October Hsiung was ready to move against Canton, but was repulsed by Huang Shih-hsiung who sent his subordinate Yao Wen-hu 姚文虎 in pursuit of Hsiung's defeated army. Hsiung, however, hurriedly remarshaled his forces, killed Yao and dispersed his army.[106]

Hsiung's victory over Yao, however, coupled with the gradual movement of Chao Chin's forces towards Canton from Ch'ao-chou seemed to have changed the local balance of power completely. On October 19, 1276,[107] Huang evacuated Canton in panic, leaving the loyalist turncoat Li Hsing-tao 李性道 in control. Hsiung Fei quickly pursued Huang to Shao-chou 韶州, which he occupied to prevent any relief of Canton from the north. Meanwhile, another local loyalist militarist, Ts'eng Feng-lung 曾逢龍, magistrate of Hsin-hui hsien 新會縣, in the west Canton Delta, had led his own troops to Canton in support of Hsiung Fei. Li Hsing-tao met Ts'eng outside the city and attempted to placate him. Ts'eng would, however, have none of it, killed Li, and occupied the city shortly after Huang's flight. On October 29 Chao Chin's army arrived.[108] Meanwhile, Hsiung-fei's army had recovered northern Kuang-tung as far north as Nan-hsiung.[109]

The loyalist recovery of Canton, along with eastern and central Kuang-tung, was destined, however, to be short lived, since Li Heng was preparing to wrest the region from loyalist hands once again. In the late Autumn of 1276 Li sent his generals Lü Shih-kuei 呂師夔[110] and Chang Yung-shih 張榮實[111] with what was apparently a mixed force of infantry and cavalry to invade Kuang-tung. Li's advance was coordinated with Yuan movements against the loyalist position in Fu-chien. Lu and Chang entered the *lu* through the strategic Mei-ling 梅嶺 pass and soon encountered the forces of Hsiung Fei and his companion Ts'eng Feng-lung, who had been ordered to defend Nan-hsiung by Chao Chin.[112] Defeated by Li Heng's generals, Ts'eng lost his life. Hsiung fell back on Shao-chou, held by Hsiung's subordinate Liu Tzu-li 劉自立.

Shao-chou was a strong position and was supported by mountain stockades commanded by Hsiao Hsing 蕭興.[113] Besieged in Shao-chou by the Yuan generals, Hsiung resisted energetically until betrayed by Liu, who opened the gates of the city to the Mongols. Hsiung drowned himself in the Pei-chiang 北江 after leading his men in desperate house to house fighting.[114] The Mongols then massacred the city's population, the usual fate meted out to those who resisted too long and too well.[115] Liu was put in charge of what remained with instructions to reduce the mountain fortresses commanded by Hsiao Hsing while Yuan armies hurried on south.[116] They took Ying-te 英德 sometime in December, 1276, or January, 1277.[117] The loss of Canton seemed imminent. This was the situation that faced the loyalists as their fleet sailed into Kuang-tung waters.

The Sung fleet remained only a short time at Ch'ao-chou, where it first anchored. The city was threatened by Yuan forces advancing from Fu-chien, and

a more centralized location for resistance, such as Canton, was in any case desired. Canton, however, fell before loyalist forces could arrive. Chao Chin had fled the city on January 6, 1276, turning its defense over to his deputy Fang Hsing 方興. Fang himself fled on the 10th, leaving the defense of the city to local loyalists led by Chao Jo-kang 趙若岡.[118]

Yuan troops arrived shortly after Fang's flight, massacred the population living south of Canton outside the walls, and forced the survivors to flee into the countryside. Chao Jo-kang then burned their dwellings, making a wasteland out of what must have been a prosperous suburb.[119] After eight days of resistance, he and colleague Ch'en Yung 陳勇 prepared to open the gates, surrender, and spare the city the fate of Shao-chou. But that night, when Ch'en came to order loyalist forces in Canton to surrender, he was killed by the enraged garrison. It was another week before Yuan forces were actually able to enter the city, which fell on January 25, 1277.[120] Lu Shih-kuei then, as reward for his cooperation, appointed Chao Jo-kang magistrate of Nan-en. Chao arrived there only to find his former commander Fang Hsing in occupation, and was unable to enter.[121]

While these events were taking place, the loyalist fleet had taken up position at Chia-tzu men 甲子門 on the coast opposite Hui-chou 惠州, on January 30, 1277.[122] Although unable to reinforce Canton in time, the arrival of the main loyalist armies nonetheless stabilized the situation and quickly made the relatively unsupported Yuan occupation of Canton untenable. Chang Chen-sun 張鎮孫,[123] a man of P'an-yü hsien 番禺縣, in which the city of Canton was located, and who had gained note as first place *chin-shih* in the palace examination of 1271, was appointed governor and military intendant of Kuang-tung (*chih-chih chien Kuang-tung ching-lüeh shih* 制置兼廣東經略使).[124] He was also notified that he had been accepted as commander by Canton men in loyalist service aboard the Sung fleet. Together with Ling Ch'en 凌震,[125] Chang had already begun to raise an army comprised of local militia (*hsiang-ping* 鄉兵) to advance on Canton on several fronts and recover the city.[126] This force, coupled with the threat of a loyalist envelopment from Chia-tzu men, now constituted a major danger to Lu Kuei-shih in Canton. Lu was in any case was having supply difficulties due to loyalist forces holding out in his rear and Wen T'ien-hsiang's operations in Chiang-hsi (see below). Lu, taking with him Liang Hsiung-fei, evacuated the city, but the loyalists were unable to gain much advantage from his flight, since Yuan forces still held the banks of the Pearl River and prevented entry. Only Ch'en I-chung was able to temporarily enter the city.[127]

Canton, although isolated by the continued presence of Yuan forces nearby, had been recovered, but elsewhere the loyalist position in Kuang-tung continued to deteriorate. The Yuan general Chou Ch'üan 周全[128] led long cavalry raids into the interior of the *lu* and suppressed any opposition encountered.[129] Hui-chou surrendered,[130] and was quickly followed by nearby Hsun-chou 循州, an important naval base, which surrendered on February 7, 1277.[131] Ch'ao-chou, isolated by the advance of Yuan forces from Fu-chien under Hu-lu-yun 忽魯軍 (Gurun?), fell on February 22.[132] Mei-chou 梅州, to the north, was taken by I-cheng-ta 易正大 (Eljigedei??),[133] while Nan-en, in the far western part of the *lu*, was surrendered by Ch'en Yao-tao 陳堯道 shortly thereafter.[134] Most of Kuang-tung was now under Yuan control, and Yuan armies blockading Canton were soon reinforced. The city, again controlled by Chao Jo-kang, was once more forced to surrender.[135] The loyalist cause again seemed lost. The Sung fleet was forced to move from its exposed position at Chia-tzu men to isolated Lan-tou 澜豆 Island in what is now the Crown colony of Hong Kong.[136]

3. Recovery and High Water Mark of Resistance

In the Spring of 1277 it remained only for Yuan armies to locate the loyalist fleet, isolate and destroy it and overcome those few remaining islands of resistance. Two events, however, prevented Qubilai's armies from achieving their final goal and prolonged the Sung resistance for two more years.

The first event, the kidnapping of Prince Nomonqan and the complete collapse of the front established by Qubilai against Qaidu in Central Asia, drew off Yuan armies at a critical moment. This was something outside the control of the Sung loyalists, and quite unexpected.

The second was the sudden appearance of powerful forces under Wen T'ien-hsiang in Kuang-tung, forces capable of once again interrupting what seems to have been tenuous Yuan supply lines supporting the main force in Canton.

Taken together, these two events led first to a complete recovery by the loyalists in Kuang-tung and then to a reassertion of their influence in the entire southeast as Yuan armies were repositioned northwards. For the first time, loyalist armies constituted a serious danger to Qubilai's still weak control over the recalcitrant south.

a) Qaidu: The Central Asian Threat

Qubilai's quarrel with his second cousin Qaidu (c. 1235-1301) dated back to the bloody events of Mongke's (r. 1251-1259) coronation, when forces loyal to the old line of *qan* Ogodei (r. 1229-1241) were brutally suppressed for an alleged plot against the new Mongol ruler.[137] The young Qaidu was not among those members of the house of Ogodei punished by Mongke and and gave the new *qan* and the new imperial line his loyalties, but Qaidu quickly came into conflict with Qubilai following Mongke's death by supporting Qubilai's younger brother Ariq-boke as the new Mongol ruler. Ariq-boke's campaign for the throne, although well-founded and well-supported, was unable to make headway against Qubilai's well-entrenched position in China, and Ariq-boke was forced to surrender in 1264.

Qaidu, however, whose role was now doubly suspect as a scion of the house of Ogodei and former supporter of Ariq-boke, decided to continue the struggle. Rallying all the Central Asian groups discontented with Qubilai, widely perceived as a usurper and whose writ in any case extended only to Mongolia and Iran within the Mongol world order, Qaidu began a struggle that was to continue into the fourteenth century.

To counter Qaidu, Qubilai began a campaign to cement his rule in Mongolia and in adjacent parts of Turkestan. To defend Mongolia, site of Qaraqorum, still technically the capital of the Mongolian world empire, he sent his son Nomonqan to the Ili Valley. Nomonqan's army, however, included contingents under princes who had once supported Ariq-boke. They took advantage of the situation to fall away from Qubilai. Nomonqan and his military commander, Hantum-noyan, were kidnapped by the rebels and Qubilai's Mongolian armies quickly collapsed in disorder (late Summer, 1277).

To rebuild a defense against Qaidu and prevent the consolidation of a large Mongol coalition against him it was urgent for Qubilai to mobilize major new forces in and about Mongolia. To create these forces, however, required enlisting Marshal Bayan, other important commanders in the final campaigns against Sung, including Tung Wen-ping,[138] and most of the Mongol forces that had been used in the south and southeast. Thus just as the loyalists were recovering their position and expanding their influence once again in 1277, Qubilai was drawing off his major armies for action elsewhere. This shift of Yuan attention provided the loyalists with a major opportunity, and they were quick to take advantage of it.[139]

b) Wen T'ien-hsiang

But whatever the ultimate reason for the great success of loyalist arms during the Summer of 1277, it was Wen T'ien-hsiang's sudden reconquest of Mei-chou in extreme eastern Kuang-tung[140] that began the loyalist recovery. After leaving the loyalist entourage in August of 1276, Wen had built up his own military base by enlisting troops from as far away as Wen-chou in Che-tung.[141] By the early Autumn of 1276, Wen had begun increasingly to dominate operations in Chiang-hsi, in spite of efforts by Chang Shih-Chieh and Ch'en I-chung to limit his influence. Wen's position was further strengthened with the defeat of the first loyalist invasion of Chiang-hsi, under Chang Shih-chieh's general Wu Chun. In spite of Chang's massive reinforcement of Wu, it was Wen's army that was henceforth to play the leading role in southwestern Fu-chien and Chiang-hsi.

His direct line of advance from his base at Nan-chien blocked by the presence of Li Heng's army in central Chiang-hsi, in October Wen began to move his base to T'ing-chou in the southwestern Fu-chien highlands. He arrived there on November 8, 1276.[142] Once in T'ing-chou Wen quickly established contact with other loyalist forces under Wu Chun, Chang Jih-chung 張日中 (from Hsing-hua chun on the coast) and others and began a major assault on southern Chiang-hsi.[143] Chao Shih-shang 趙時賞[144] and Chao Meng-ying 趙孟榮 were sent in late December or early January to take Ning-tu 寧都 in southeastern Chiang-hsi. Simultaneously, Wu Chun was to assault Yu-tu 雩都[145] and threaten Yuan supply routes to Kuang-tung along the Kan River Valley. As the loyalist armies advanced, rebellions against the Yuan flared as local leaders mobilized troops to come to the aid of loyalist armies.[146]

Wen's well directed attack, and the local risings in support of it, threatened to cut off the troops sent by Li Heng to Kuang-tung under Lu Shih-kuei and Chang Yung-shih. Li had no choice but to take action against Wen and his generals. He first sent a force to halt Chao Shih-shang's advance from Ning-tu, and then marched towards Wen's main base at T'ing-chou, arriving there late in January or early in Feburary, 1277.

Wen, who appears to have sent his best troops into Chiang-hsi, had no choice but to call upon his generals for help[147] and evacuate T'ing-chou. He retreated towards Chang 漳 on the coast, which refused to admit him,[148] and eventually took up position at Lung-yen. There he was reinforced by troops from Chiang-hsi under Chao Meng-ying.[149] Wen's position, however, was now untenable, since the coast had long since fallen away from the loyalists and the court itself had sought refuge further south.

Meanwhile Wu Chun had fallen back to his own base at Jui-chin 瑞金 and from there had retreated on February 16, 1277[150] to T'ing-chou. At T'ing-chou Wu surrendered to Li Heng's ruthless Mongol general So-tu 唆都.[151] So-tu then attempted to use Wu Chun to gain the surrender of Wen, but Wen only executed Wu "to help morale."[152] Isolated on all sides, Wen had no choice but to move into eastern Kuang-tung, where he arrived and took Mei-chou sometime in April or early May.[153]

Thus ended the second loyalist invasion of Chiang-hsi. It appeared to have accomplished little more than the temporary discomfort of Yuan forces stationed at Canton, and to have occasioned a brief second loyalist recovery of the city. Wen, however, left behind him in Chiang-hsi a number of pockets of resistance --including, apparently, Chao Shih-shang's army-- and the presence of his own army in nearby Kuang-tung limited the freedom of action of Li Heng and his confederates. That same army, moreover, encouraged other loyalist commanders in Kuang-tung, helped cover the exposed loyalist position on the coast and allowed Chang Shih-chieh and Ch'en I-chung to consider a counterattack.

c) The Counterattack Begins

Interestingly, it was neither from the direction of Wen's army nor from the loyalist fleet that the first moves in the loyalist counterattack were made, but rather from that of local resistance leaders. About the time that Wen T'ien-hsiang had seized Mei-chou, a revolt led by Ch'en Tsan陳瓚, son of the loyalist martyr Ch'en Wen-lung陳文龍,[154] broke out in Fu-chien and returned strategic Hsing-hua chun to loyalist control.[155] Not long after, probably sometime in May, Chang Chen-hai recaptured Canton for the loyalists for the second time.[156] On the coast, Chang Shih-chieh retook Ch'ao-chou, Kuang-tung's second largest city, probably some time in June.[157]

The loyalists' counterattack had begun in the coastal cities, but it was in Chiang-hsi that the greatest initial gains were to be achieved. During the fourth lunar month of 1277 (May 5 to June 2), some of Wen T'ien-hsiang's supporters had gained control of Hui-ch'ang會昌 in the extreme southeast corner of Chiang-hsi. Wen himself entered the area during the following month, recovered T'ing-chou, and advanced to Yu-tu where he won a victory on July 5. This success allowed him to enter strategic Hsing-kuo興國, dangerously near the Yuan's Kan Valley supply line to Kuang-tung. Having established his advanced base at Hsing-kuo, Wen sent troops to attack Chi吉, in central Chiang-hsi, on the Kan River, and to besiege Kan贛, located on the same river further south.[158]

Revolts once again broke out widely, not only in central and southern Chiang-hsi, which fell away from the Yuan almost completely, but also in Hunan, Hu-pei, An-hui (Huai hsi-lu淮西路), eastern Chiang-hsi (Chiang tung-lu江東路) and in Fu-chien as well.[159] Region after region fell away from the Mongols. Faced with such general opposition and with now limited manpower, Li Heng could only bide his time while regrouping his forces for counterattack, and attempting to hold strategic Kan, where he dispatched what reinforcements he could spare.[160]

In Kuang-tung, Chang Shih-chieh, encouraged by the recovery of Hsing-hua chun, was preparing to recover Fu-chien. Setting sail for Ch'üan-chou with a force of Huai regulars, he joined up with She troops from T'ing-chou and neighboring areas --one band led by its queen-- and a small contingent sent by Ch'en Tsan, and laid seige to P'u Shou-keng's urban domain on August 18, 1277.[161] P'u, however, was determined to resist. He ruthlessly suppressed a general uprising within and without the city led primarily by Chao clansmen.[162]

Elsewhere in Fu-chien, however, the Yuan rapidly lost ground. Chang[163] and Shao-wu[164] were both recovered, and only quick action (he massacred the offenders) by former loyalist Wang Chi-weng王積翁[165] prevented a rising by Huai regulars stationed in Fu-chou, then denuded of Mongol troops.[166] Wang, however, recognized his weak position, and was soon in communication with Chang Shih-chieh himself.[167] Fu-chien appeared to be on the verge of falling away completely from the Yuan, and loyalist influence was being felt again as far away as Che-tung.[168]

d) High Water Mark and Failure

During these months of recovery, the loyalist fleet moved from Lan-tou Island and took up position on the mainland, in what is now the New Territories of Hong Kong. It anchored first at Kuan-fu ch'ang官富場,[169] the modern Kowloon, then little inhabited, but an important center of salt production.[170] The fleet arrived there in May or early June.[171] Here Ch'en I-chung and the other loyalist ministers still in attendance had a travelling palace built while a lookout tower was established on Sheng-shan聖山 Mountain, just behind modern Kowloon. Part of this lookout tower still exists, and it is venerated to this day as the Sung-wang t'ai, although no longer on its original site, which was used during World War II by the Japanese to build an airbase.[172]

Many other relics associated with the presence of the Sung court in the New Territories also survive, each playing its part in local Cantonese folklore.[173] Due to the availability of salt revenues, and because of their relative isolation, the New Territories formed a logical base for the loyalists.

But while the loyalist fleet rested in comparative tranquility in Kuang-tung, time was running out for restoration forces in Chiang-hsi and Fu-chien as they encountered increasing difficulty. Li Heng began his counterattack against Wen T'ien-hsiang in late August, 1277,[174] even before the crisis had subsided in Central Asia. Leading a force of "picked" troops north through the Ta-yu ling大庾嶺 Mountains,[175] he completely surprised Wen T'ien-hsiang at Hsing-kuo and forced him northward in precipitate flight, his army slowly dispersing, and the Mongols in close pursuit. Finally, on September 26, 1277,[176] Li overtook Wen and inflicted a decisive defeat on him at K'ung-k'eng in which Wen narrowly escaped capture. Only the personal sacrifice of Chao Shih-shang, who surrendered to Li, claiming he was Wen, allowed the real Wen to escape, leaving behind him his wife, two daughters and two sons to fall into the hands of Li Heng.[177]

By November Wen was once again back in T'ing-chou, and after a brief attempt to resume the campaign in Chiang-hsi via Hui-ch'ang with those forces he was able to reassemble from his scattered armies, Wen fled Chiang-hsi through An-yuan and took up position in Hsun-chou in Kuang-tung.[178] He left behind him his shattered hopes, and was never again to reenter Chiang-hsi. Henceforth he fought in Kuang-tung. One by one, Wen's other commanders were defeated by militarily (but not numerically) superior Mongol forces, which easily rode through the largely peasant levies that made up the bulk of the resistance forces.[179]

In Fu-chien, Chang Shih-chieh's siege of Ch'üan-chou, well and ably defended by P'u Shou-keng, had dragged on inconclusively. An attack on the southern gate of the city in September was unsuccessful, and the enthusiasm of Chang's army was waning rapidly. The ebb in morale was helped, the *Erh-wang pen-mo* informs us, by P'u Shou-keng, who is said to have secretly bribed the She troops in the army not to press the siege.[180] This delay before Ch'üan-chou effectively doomed Chang Shih-chieh's chances of recovering all of Fu-chien, and of using it as a base to advance north. P'u and the other Yuan proxies in the army had by September sent urgent requests for Mongol aid.[181]

By early October the immediate crisis on the Central Asian frontier had passed, and help was not long in coming. So-tu, under the command of T'a-ch'u塔出,[182] now in control of Mongol operations in Chiang-hsi, was ordered to advance by land to Ch'üan-chou, relieve the city and move down the coast to the Sung base in Kuang-tung.[183] T'a-ch'u himself, in cooperation with Li Heng and Lu Shih-kuei, was to prepare to move by land through Chiang-hsi.[184]

So-tu prepared for an immediate advance on Ch'üan-chou, but was detained by the urgent implorings of the magistrate of Hsin信 in Chiang-tung. The magistrate feared loyalist forces assembling at Shao-wu.[185] Changing his line of march, So-tu then hurried to Chien-ning, encountering and defeating a large loyalist force on the way at Ch'ung-an, on the Fu-chien frontier.[186] Reaching Chien-ning, So-tu defended the city against attack by the loyalist general Chang Ch'ing張清, defeating him in a night ambush. Pursuring Chang, So Tu fought a series of successful battles against him and eventually took Nan-chien. From there he marched to Fu-chou where Wang Chi-weng turned the city over to him.[187]

Fu-chou had been almost totally without garrison before So-tu's arrival, and could easily have been taken by Chang Shih-chieh. Once in possession of Fu-chou, moreover, Chang would have been in a position to link up with loyalist

forces operating in Che-tung. He could have threatened, if not taken, Lin-an, also poorly provided with defensive troops due to Bayan's departure north to meet Qaidu's armies.

Recapturing Lin-an, even if it could not be held, would have provided a great psychological boost for the restorationist cause. Failure to even attempt to take the old capital was a major tactical error on the part of the loyalists. This was perhaps forseen by Ch'en I-chung when he opposed Chang Shih-chieh's plan to assault Ch'üan-chou. He said that the war should be waged against Mongols, rather than against other Chinese.[188]

Once in Fu-chou, So-tu was quickly joined by Il-temish (Yeh-ti-mi-shih 也的迷失). He had taken Shao-chou and ended the loyalist threat to Chiang-hsi and Che-tung from that quarter forever.[189]

From Fu-chou, So-tu marched to Hsing-hua chun, which he besieged and took on October 16, 1277.[190] Since Ch'en Tsan had asked to surrendered once, but had then closed the gates of the city to continue a hard fought battle, So-tu massacred the garrison and apparently a large part of the population, taking 30,000 heads.[191] Ch'en himself was dismembered as an example to others.[192] So-tu then moved on to Chang-chou, which also put up a spirited defense. So-tu finally captured the city and cut off 3,000 heads.[193] Delayed at Hsing-hua chun and later at Chang-chou, So-tu had meanwhile sent his son Pai-chia-nu 百家奴[194] to take ship south to meet T'a-ch'u, since time was running out. Pai-chia-nu arrived in Ch'üan-chou, however, to find the loyalist army long gone.[195] Chang Shih-chieh, alarmed by the appearance of So-tu's army, had suddenly given up the siege on October 20, 1277 and sailed back to Kuang-tung.[196]

Fu-chien was again lost to the loyalists as one center of resistance after the other was crushed. Pai-chia-nu sailed down the coast, towards Chia-tzu men. Loyalist forces on the coast quickly surrendered as the armada sailed past.[197] Only Ch'ao-chou, against which So-tu seems to have advanced by land, resisted and had to be bypassed.[198] So-tu then first marched north with a select force of cavalry[199] to Hui-chou, where he established contact with forces under Lu Shih-kuei,[200] and then to Canton where he finally made contact with T'a-ch'u early in 1278.[201]

In Chiang-hsi, T'a-ch'u had begun his own operations shortly after So-tu's invasion of Fu-chien. Entering Kuang-tung in the ninth lunar month of 1277 (September 29-October 27, 1277),[202] T'a-ch'u's armies fought a victorious battle at Mei-ling[203] and then advanced with ease to Canton, which was surrendered by Chang Chen-sung on December 1, 1277.[204] A general uprising of the "righteous armies of the various *lu*"[205] was insufficient to save the city and was quickly suppressed.

Once in control of Canton, T'a-ch'u no longer needed the direct support of So-tu and he was sent back to take Ch'ao-chou, now the largest city under loyalist control in Canton. The city, besieged by So-tu's army cooperating with a fleet under Liu Shen 劉深 was taken, and its population massacred, after a lengthy siege, on March 4, 1278.[206] This made Ch'ao-chou the third Kuang-tung city (Shao-chou was the first) to suffer massacre, since the population of the city of Canton itself had been inexplicably massacred on February 1, by the troops of Lu Shih-kuei and T'a-ch'u.[207] This could have been retaliation for some attempted uprising by the city's surviving population, but no such revolt is mentioned in our sources. In any event, once again resistance appeared to have ended in Kuang-tung, and the days of Sung loyalism appeared numbered.

While Yuan armies were launching their counterattack and advancing from all sides upon it, the loyalist fleet remained precariously perched at Kuan-fu ch'ang and later at other positions in

the modern New Territories. Probably during mid-October, when word was received of the appearance of T'a-ch'u's forces in the north, the loyalist fleet moved to an anchorage off Ch'ao-chou, closer to the scene of action in Fu-chien. There the fleet was rejoined by Chang Shih-chieh, probably during the last week of October.[208]

Yuan armies were not far behind, and by the 11th lunar month (November 27-December 25, 1277), the loyalist forces in eastern Kuang-tung were under simultaneous attack by So-tu's army and Liu Shen's fleet, which surprised the loyalist fleet at its anchorage at Ch'ien-wan and severely defeated Chang Shih-chieh's efforts at counterattack.[209]

The loyalists had no choice but to flee up the Pearl River Estuary to the Hsiu-shan 秀山 Peninsula,[210] located about 30 miles southwest of Tung-huan 東莞. They probably arrived there sometime in early December.[211] Most of Kuang-tung had, however, by this time reverted to Yuan control, soon forcing the loyalists to move their anchorage yet again to escape detection, this time across the Pearl River Estuary to Ching-ao 井澳 in Hsiang-shan hsien 香山縣, near modern Macao,[212] where they arrived on January 16, 1278.[213] The exposed site was, however, not a good choice for a refuge, and shortly after its arrival the loyalist fleet, already ravaged by malaria and other tropical diseases,[214] was battered by a great storm in which a large proportion of the surviving loyalists lost their lives.[215] The Yuan pursuers were not far behind, and on January 17 a sea battle was fought between the survivors of the storm and Liu Shen's fleet.[216]

Although Chang Shih-chieh won the battle, Liu Shen's relentless pursuit continued, forcing the loyalist fleet to play cat and mouse with Yuan forces in the islands of the Pearl River Estuary until Chang and the remaining loyalists were finally able to shake off their pursuers by withdrawing down the Kuang-tung coast to K'ang-chou 石岡州 Island in Hua hsien 化縣 in Kuang-hsi.[217] Only such fervent local loyalist supporters as the rich commoner Ma Nan-pao 馬南寶,[218] who generously contributed 1,000 *tan* of grain to feed the Sung army at one point during its wanderings about the Canton delta, prevented total collapse.[219]

During this period of great difficulty for the loyalists their ranks suffered a major defection in the person of Ch'en I-chung. Ch'en was in favor of moving operations to Champa, the Indochinese principality which had long maintained close relations with Sung China and was ultimately itself to fall prey to Mongol ambitions. In this desire he seems to have met the opposition of many remaining loyalists. Ch'en then left the fleet and sailed to Champa alone, ostensibly to raise more troops. After his departure he had no more contact with the loyalists and finally died somewhere in Siam after the Mongol assault on Champa.[220] Ch'en was replaced by his old opponent Lu Hsiu-fu.[221]

4. The Final Battles, 1278-9

The choice of K'ang-chou as a base of operations was an unfortunate one since it severed loyalist connections with the Canton delta, where the movement for a Sung restoration continued to enjoy its strongest support. Three major attempts over a period of several months to take Lei-chou 雷州, on the Kuang-chou wan 廣州灣 Peninsula, failed one after the other.[222] Supplies became scarce as attempts by loyalist officials on Hai-nan 海南 island to supply the Sung fleet were thwarted by a lack of suitable harbors and Yuan blockade.[223]

Disease took further toll within depleted loyalist ranks, including among its victims Prince Shih himself, who died on May 8, 1278. He received the posthumous title Tuan-tsung 端宗.[224] He was succeeded by his brother, Prince Ping, two days later,[225] but only after heated discussions among the loyalists. Many now favored abandoning the struggle

and dispersing. Only the fervent admonitions of Lu Hsiu-fu to continue the struggle as long as one last Chao remained alive carried the day in this difficult situation.[226] Events in Kuang-tung, however, soon forced the loyalists to give up their unfortunate plan of basing operations in K'ang-chou, and to return.

Soon after the departure of the loyalist fleet from Kuang-tung waters, the Mongols, feeling once again that Sung resistance had finally ended, began recalling their forces. In so doing they repeated the error that had allowed the loyalist recovery of 1277 by failing to crush all resistance forces, including the loyalist fleet, not to mention Wen T'ien-hsiang's rump army. This easing of pressure, as before, allowed the loyalists to recover lost ground and make one last attempt to restore the dynasty.

Recovery began in the Spring and Summer of 1278. In the third lunar month, Wen T'ien-hsiang, who had been rebuilding his army at Hsun-chou after the collapse of his Chiang-hsi campaigns, took Hui-chou.[227] Further north, Ling Ch'en 凌震, an old colleague of Chang Chen-sun, and Wang Tao-fu 王道夫,[228] a man of P'an-yü 番禺縣 hsien who had been a *chin-shih* in 1269, reoccupied Canton for the loyalists.[229] News of this coup soon reached the loyalist fleet at K'ang-chou and a decision was made to sail back to Kuang-tung. This time Chang Shih-chieh led the fleet to Yai-shan, an island in the west delta now part of Hsin-hui hsien that is favored by nature as a defensive positon of some strength. The loyalist fleet dropped anchor there on June 28, 1278, proclaimed their new emperor and called upon the people of Kuang-tung and of China to revolt against the Mongols.[230]

Word of the new loyalist advances soon reached the Yuan court. Finally, in August 1278, the court appointed three of its most experienced generals to end the loyalist movement once and for all. Empowered were Li Heng, Wen T'ien-hsiang's old opponent, Chang Hung-fan 張弘範,[231] who had repeatedly proven his ability in earlier campaigns against the Sung, and T'a-ch'u. Li was to advance into Kuang-tung from Chiang-hsi and Chang from Fu-chien, while T'a-ch'u, positioned in Chiang-hsi at Kan, was in general charge of logistics.[232] The advance began in late October or early November.[233] Even as Yuan commanders marshaled their forces, loyalist support grew throughout Kuang-tung and even in coastal Fu-chien as popular forces numbering in the thousands and myriads rose to answer the call of the Sung court.[234]

Wen T'ien-hsiang, as usual, was the most energetic of the loyalist generals, as he and his competent staff organized eastern Kuang-tung for defense, recovered Ch'ao-chou and extended Wen's influence as far as Chang in Fu-chien. However, Wen gained little cooperation in his efforts from Chang Shih-chieh and other loyalists leaders, who feared the rapid growth of Wen's power. Wen's request to be allowed to come to court was refused, and Chang Shih-chieh appointed his own officials to many of the cities recovered by Wen, perhaps as an affront to him. Wen's proposal that Canton be made loyalist headquarters was also rudely rejected.[235] But in the east, Wen quickly gained the respect and admiration of local leaders by putting down dangerous pirates and bandits who had arisen in numbers after the Yuan withdrawal. Included among them were the brothers Ch'en and their She army.[236] The stage was now set for the final confrontation.

The military situation was fundamentally different in the Autumn of 1278 from what it had been in either 1276 or 1277. Resistance to the Mongols was now geographically confined. There were no major revolts for the Yuan government to contend with in Chiang-hsi or other areas to impede their advance upon the main base of resistance in Kuang-tung. On the other hand, the restricted scope of resistance also simplified the defensive problem of the loyalists, who in any case had their backs to the wall. The campaign was not going to be an easy one for the Mongols.

Li Heng and Chang Hung-fan seem to have begun their advances more or less simultaneously, probably in November. Li at first had the easier time of it. He entered Kuang-tung more or less as planned, and quickly overran Ying-te hsien 英德縣 and Ch'ing- yuan hsien 清遠縣, with defenders Ling Ch'en and Wang Tao-fu falling back in front of him. Fighting his way south he took Canton on December 23, 1278.[237] Chang Hung-fan, however, had been unable to keep pace with Li, and was seriously delayed by Wen T'ien-hsiang's energetic resistance. As a consequence Li soon had to face a determined loyalist counterattack. Wang Tao-fu and Ling Ch'en were sent north from Yai-shan by Chang Shih-chieh with an army of boat people, and they recaptured Canton on January 17, 1279.[238] Li Heng, its defender, however, was nearby waiting for word of Li Hung-fan's arrival, and reacted swiftly. Li quickly retook the city, captured Wang Fu-tao and later defeated Ling Ch'en's desperate counterattack at Chiao-t'ang 芝塘, just east of the city on February 6, 1279.[239] Thus ended the last loyalist attempt on Canton.

Meanwhile, Chang Hung-fan had retaken Chang and had reduced various mountain stockages barring his entrance into Kuang-tung. Advancing with unexpected rapidity by land and by ship down the coast, he then surprised and captured Wen T'ien-hsiang at Wu-p'o ling 五坡嶺 outside of Hai-feng 海豐 on February 6, 1279.[240] Wen, the *CCL* informs us, had not been expecting coordinated Yuan movements by land and by sea and had been prepared only for a seaborne invasion.[241] Wen's remaining armies quickly collapsed, and only Chao Meng-ying escaped.[242] The path was now clear for the advance to the final loyalist stronghold at Yai-shan, the location of which had become known to Li Heng from a deserter.[243] This time the Sung fleet did not flee but prepared for one final battle to decide the outcome of the campaign.

Yai-shan had been well chosen by the loyalists as a last refuge. Adequate supples were available locally, and the position could only be approached with great difficulty by any opposing fleet, since lines of advance were limited by submerged rocks and the numerous sandbars built up by silt from the rivers of the Canton Delta. Only two routes led to the loyalist position. One was a narrow passage leading through the Yai-men 厓門 Gate,[244] which was flanked by rocky cliffs on both sides The other, leading from the northest, fed through a narrow passage to Yai-men in the west, between the Main Island of Yai-shan and another to the south known as the Eastern Island of Yai-shan. Strong local tidal action had to be taken into account by any enemy fleet.[245]

The loyalists were anchored somewhat to the east of the Yai-men Gate on that side of the Main Island of Yai-shan facing the Eastern Island. There is a natural harbor at this site. The loyalist fleet, including perhaps as many as one thousand ocean-going war-junks,[246] was drawn up in a long rectangle, forming a character *i* 一, with sterns outward.[247] Each had been attached to adjoining ships with large ropes to form the tightest possible line. Wooden palisades, looking like the towers of a city wall, had been built on the sterns of ships located at the corners of the rectangle, and interlocking planks formed a wall surrounding the entire line.

This arrangement, which seems to have been the brainchild of Chang Shih-chieh and Lu Hsiu-fu,[248] had the advantage of giving height to the Sung defenders. They could shoot and hurl objects down on the heads of their enemies who could reply in kind only with difficulty. The ropes and woodwork also precluded a premature breakup of the Sung fleet, something that must have been much feared by Chang Shih-chieh, since loyalist morale was at a low ebb due to continuing defeats. The ropes also made it difficult for the Mongols to isolate and destroy individual Sung ships. Wooden walls and palasades could also be useful for concealment of the defenders.

The arrangement chosen by Chang and



Map Three: Chiang-hsi

Lu, however, had the major disadvantage that it made any maneuver whatever on the part of the Sung fleet impossible. Moreover, as a static deployment, the arrangement made the Sung fleet subject to blockade and siege, which could lead to the exhaustion of Sung forces without an actual battle. The formation chosen for the Sung fleet by the loyalist commanders, in fact, reveals no clear understanding of naval warfare and a fixation on traditional positional strategy. It clearly bears out Lo Jung-pang's evaluations concerning the rapid decline of the Sung navy as a strategic and tactical force from the end of the twelfth century.[249]

As the Sung commanders completed their final preparations, their antagonists arrived on the scene, Chang Hung-fan on February 25 and Li Heng on March 6.[250] Recognizing the difficulty of the tactical problem facing them, the Yuan generals planned carefully. It was decided to first weaken the loyalists by cutting off outside sources of supply before risking a general engagement, since the Mongol fleet was greatly inferior in numbers and quality of forces to the Sung fleet.[251]

In accordance with this plan, Li landed unexpectedly on the Main Island of Yai-shan near the main loyalist base, previously considered virtually impregnable by the loyalist generals because of the surrounding ring of rocky mountains and the difficulty in approaching by sea. Li had brought with him about 180 light, shallow draft boats[252] which, unlike Chang Hung-fan's larger, ocean-going junks, enjoyed free movement in the battle area and were thus capable of making the Main Island landing.

Once ashore, Li's troops took the Sung base, and beat back determined loyalist counterattacks from the fleet anchored opposite the base. His movement cut it off from all local sources of water, food and wood, the latter being especially important because of limited loyalist supplies of arrows. To complete his domination of the position, Li installed batteries of *huo-p'ao* 火砲, heavy bombardment engines whose missiles were propelled by counterweights,[253] in a stockade built on a mountain above the former Sung headquarters and bombarded the Sung fleet. The bombardment, however, failed to have much effect since it was apparently carried out at close to maximum range, and Chao Hung-fan, in overall command of the operation, ordered firing to cease since he feared that it might cause the Sung ships to scatter, making it more difficult to bring a final end to Sung resistance.[254]

While Li was securing the land base on the island, Chang himself was carrying out his own preliminary operations against the Sung ships, with skirmishes occurring almost every day. He assaulted a large, isolated group of Boat People, about 1,000 sail --possibly the remnants of Wang Fu-tao's army-- anchored to the north of the main loyalist fleet, outside the Sung lines. Chang's experienced crews made fast work of them, since the small Boat People ships were unsuited to naval warfare, and the Sung ships could not leave their fortress to help their allies due to the ropes securing them to each other. Chang then attempted to use captured Boat People vessels as fire ships against the main Sung units. This tactic, however, proved a failure. The Sung daubed their ships with mud, employed long poles to push the fire ships away and tubes that spouted water to extinguish the blazes.[255]

Chang was rejoined by Li, who had left a garrison in his stockade to deny the enemy access to the interior of the island. Chang then waited some days for hunger and thirst to weaken the loyalists while preparing his ships for battle. Finally, on March 19, 1279, when Chang sensed that the Sung ships might flee due to their difficulties, he made his attack. A loyalist source credits him with only 500 small junks, and adds that 200 of these arrived too late to play much of a role in the battle.[256] Chang divided his force into four separate flotillas, each of which took up a "camel hump formation" opposite the



Map Four
Kuang-tung

straight Sung lines.

Li Heng began his attack in the morning as the tide receded to the south. He used the force of the tidal flow to gain speed and momentum while approaching from the north and northwest. He soon became involved in desperate fighting as his attack drew in Sung reserves, elite Huai regular forces, which forced him to withdraw temporarily. Meanwhile, a second attack had been launched from the south, countered with Greek-fire by the Sung. This attack, however, was soon joined by the remaining two Yuan flotillas, in the east and west. The latter attack was possibly led by the Yuan commander, Chang Hung-fan himself.

The battle lasted most of the day. Yuan ships used their mobility to the utmost, disengaging when pressed by the enemy, only to attack anew at the same or a different place on the Sung line. In the afternoon Li Heng reentered the battle. His ships, like those in the other flotillas, turned about according to Chang Hung-fan's orders so as to neutralize the Sung's advantage of height. Li's troops soon boarded one of the Sung ships, and cut the ropes binding it to the others. Into the gap thereby created in the Sung lines he led small swift vessels (*ba'adur*, "hero"), manned by picked crews. Li's boats wove in and out among the Sung ships, creating havoc. The Yuan flotilla stationed in the south repeated Li's earlier movement, and used the pressure of the incoming tide to gain momentum. These ships braved the greek fire of the Sung line and boarded several ships.

By late afternoon, the Sung had lost a number of ships and their fortress line had been breached at several places. Suddenly one ship lowered its standard to surrender, and others followed suit. The battle was won. Some 800 Sung large ships were taken. Many of these were later used in the Mongol invasions of Japan and other overseas points.[257] Some 100,000 corpses were left floating in the water for a week. One of these was the body of Prince Ping. He had been drowned by Lu Hsiu-fu, since the emperor's ship was anchored in the very center of the Sung rectangle and was unable to escape.

Of the major loyalist figures, only Chang Shih-chieh escaped the debacle. He cut himself loose from the Sung battle line with 16 ships, and put to sea, taking advantage of a sudden fog to escape Li Heng. Chang took along with him Empress Dowager Ying, the mother of Prince Shih, and a few of his own Huai troops, in the hope of finding another member of the house of Chao to raise up as Sung emperor.

Chang later returned to the site of the battle to bury the dead and pick up survivors. But his presence soon drew the notice of local Yuan commanders. Chang was defeated and pursued to K'ang-chou by Liu Tzu-li, Hsiung-fei's betrayer in 1276. The Empress Dowager Ying committed suicide, but Chang still hoped to carry on the struggle from Annam. Before he could carry out his plan, however, he was drowned during a storm at sea off Nan-en on June 14, 1279.[258] Back at Yai-shan, the Yuan army had carved an inscription to note its victory and departed.

D. The Aftermath of Resistance

The prolonged Sung resistance in southeast China had great physical impact upon the entire region. It was especially severe in Kuang-tung, where fighting lasted the longest, and was most intense. Three of Kuang-tung's cities, Canton, Ch'ao-chou and Shao-chou suffered massacres, while most others changed hands at least twice, and were thereby exposed to the wrath of conquering forces from both sides. Loss of life must have been enormous, possibly as high as 500,000 persons, about one seventh of the total population.[259]

Property loss was probably even greater in magnitude, since sieges were now being conducted with the use of gunpowder, and were far more destuctive

than in earlier times. Moreover, the entire province was the scene of military activity during the resistance movement, not just a few fought over areas. Traditional armies in China, and elsewhere in the Middle Ages, were simply unable to as much as march across any area without completely disrupting the lives and livelihoods of its inhabitants, whether they came as protectors or as conquerors.

But perhaps most important of the physical effects of the resistance movement upon Kuang-tung was the almost total disruption of trade that it must have engendered in one of Sung China's most commercialized regions. The Yuan period saw an almost complete concentration of China's international trade in Fu-chien's Ch'üan-chou, away from heavily damaged Fu-chou and from Canton and Ch'ao-chou.

The results of war not only physically damaged Canton, but also cut it off both from its growing international connections with southeast Asia and its Chinese markets. Not only could Cantonese merchants not trade abroad as they had in the past, but the division of Chiang-hsi into competing zones of loyalist and Yuan control prevented goods from Canton from reaching other points in China and products from the Chiang-hsi and Kuang-tung hinterland from reaching Canton. Even after the close of the resistance movement, the old patterns may have been so disrupted as to make a restoration of the old system of international and inter-regional trade in the southeast impossible.

That these and other effects of the Sung Resistance movement were long-lasting is, moreover, clearly indicated by continued disturbance in Kuang-tung long after the formal end of the resistance movement itself. Almost every year in the decade and a half following the end of resistance saw a major rebellion in some part of Kuang-tung. Piracy likewise became an accute problem, and aboriginal uprisings chronic.[260] Only at the end of Qubilai's long reign (1260-1294) did the region begin to quiet down and then, only gradually.[261]

Even if open resistance had subsided, Kuang-tung, however, remained a haven of orthodoxy throughout the Yuan period, and many of its most prominent scholars and other local leaders refused to take service under the new regime. With the restoration of native Chinese control under the Ming, Kuang-tung scholars set to work on numerous private histories, biographies and other literary works concerned with the Sung Resistance Movement, most of which displayed obvious partiality. That works such as the *Yai-shan chi* contain so much material not found in other sources is in and of itself a tribute to the power of loyalism throughout the southeast and to the importance of its traditions for the people of the region.

The literary tradition of loyalism, in fact, continued through the Ch'ing dynasty, when the southeast was again the focus of last ditch resistance to foreign conquest, and loyalism is still very much evident today in the many modern works by Cantonese scholars on the events, personalities and even legends[262] associated with the Sung resistance.

In 1957 the raising of a memorial stone to rededicate the Sung-wang t'ai was a major event in Hong Kong, celebrated by the publication of a special commemorative volume, the *Sung huang-t'ai chi-nien chi*宋皇臺紀念集. The work contains pictorial materials associated with the resistance, selections from the relevant source material, a number of secondary studies and articles on the movement, a collection of literary writings by participants in the Sung resistance movement and later writers, down to the present, and a history of the Sung-wang t'ai itself and of its rededication.

Publication of the volume and the rededication of the monument, one of many sites of pilgimage associated with the resistance,[263] on its new site symbolize the interest of the peoples of the Canton Delta in the Sung Resistance Movement, and the great meaning that the events of the movement have for them. After 700 years, little has altered in this regard.

NOTES

1. The process of handing over the Sung Capital to the Mongols began in February and ended in March. A convenient date for the fall of the capital is 25 February, 1276, when the last Sung emperor to reign in Lin-an began his journey to captivity in the north. For a detailed consideration of the events leading up to the Sung surrender from the perspective of the Sung court, see Jennefer Wei-yen Jay-Preston, *Loyalist Personalities and Activities in the Sung to Yuan Transition*, CA 1273-1300," unpublished doctoral dissertation, Australian National University, 1983, pp. 18-48.

2. For an introduction to Chinese positional warfare see H. Franke, "Siege and Defense of Towns in Medieval China," in Frank A. Kierman, Jr., and John K. Fairbank (eds.), *Chinese Ways in Warfare*, pp. 151-201.

3. For a good introduction to the events associated with the Sung Restoration see E. Kaplan, *Yueh Fei and the Founding of the Southern Sung*, unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Iowa, 1970. See also the description of events in Otto Franke, *op. cit.*, IV, 183ff.

4. For an account of life within one of these cities, the Sung capital of Lin-an, see Jacques Gernet, *Daily Life in China on the Eve of the Mongol Invasion 1250-1276*, translated by H.M. Wright, (1962).

5. On the history of Chinese penetration of the southern, tropical regions of China see H.J. Wiens, *China's March to the Tropics*, (1954). On the early history of the southeast in general with special reference to T`ang times see also Edward H. Schafer, *The Vermilion Bird*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, (1967), and specifically on the Canton Delta, also Hsü Chun-ming徐俊鳴, Kuo P'ei-chung郭培忠, and Hsü Hsiao-mei徐曉梅 *Kuang-chou shih-huo*广州史话, (Shanghai, 1984).

6. The best general introduction to the history of the Indian Ocean trade is K.N. Chaudhuri, *Trade and Civilization in the Indian Ocean*, (Cambridge, 1985). See also Wang Gungwu, "The Nanhai Trade: A Study of the Early History of Chinese Trade in the South China Sea," *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 31 (1958), 1-133; G.F. Hourani, *Arab Seafaring in the Indian Ocean in Ancient and Early Medieval Times*, (Princeton, 1951); P. Wheatley, "Geographical Notes on Some Commodities Involved in Sung Maritime Trade," *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 32 (1959), 5-140; O.W. Wolters, *Early Indonesian Commerce: A Study of the Origins of Srivijaya*, (New York, 1967); J. Needham, Wang Ling and Lu Gwei-djen, *Science and Civilization in China: IV: Physics and Physical Technology, Part 3: Civil Engineering and Nautics*, (Cambridge, 1971), pp. 379-699, and Kenneth R. Hall, *Maritime Trade and State Development in Early Southeast Asia*, (Honolulu, 1985).

7. See Yoshinobu Shiba, *Commerce and Society in Sung China*, translated by M. Elvin, Ann Arbor, 1970, and his "Sung Foreign Trade: Its Scope and Organization," in M. Rossabi, Editor, *China Among Equals*, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1983), pp. 89-115.

8. On the development of China's tea industry see as an introduction the unpublished doctoral dissertation of Robert Paul Gardella, Jr., *Fukien's Tea Industry and Trade in Ch'ing and Republican Times: the Developmental Consequences of a Traditional Commodity Export* (University of Washington, 1976).

9. Marco Polo, *The Travels*, trans. by R. Latham (Penguin Books, 1958), p. 237.

10. See L. Dermigny, *La Chine et L'occident: la commerce a Canton au XVIIIe*

siecle, 1719-1833, three volumes and album (Paris, 1964).

11. On the She in Sung times see Hsü Sung-shih, *Yueh-chiang liu-yü jen-min shih* 粵江流域民史(revised edition, 1963), pp. 128-131. On swidden agriculture in southeast China see the recent account in Francesca Bray, *Science and Civilization in China, Volume 6: Biology and Biological Technology, Part 2: Agriculture* (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 98-101.

12. *YS*, 132, 3216 (biography of Ho-la-tai哈剌歹).

13. Chang's biography can be found in the *SS*, 451, 7B-10B. His family was of northern origin, from Fan-yang , a city located about a hundred miles southeast of modern Peking, but was forced to flee Chin domains for political reasons. As a young man, Chang Shih-chieh was attached to the elite Huai border armies and made a name for himself there and in Kuang-tung, where he was later stationed. He came into national prominence during the last years of Sung rule through his spirited defense of the Sung capital of Lin-an against the Mongols.

14. *EWPM*, 26. Her name is given simply as Hsü fu-jen許夫人, "Lady Hsü." Women were often tribal chiefs, especially among Yao groups, as is the case here.

15. On Wen's association with the She see especially the *EWPM*, 26. The army raised by Wen in 1275 while stationed at Kan-chou贛州 in Chiang-hsi may also have been comprised of She. See the *SS*, 277, 21B. There are innumerable biographies available of Wen T'ien-hsiang. Four have been used extensively in the preparation of this study, Wen's *SS* biography, 418, 20B-27A, translated in its entirety by William A. Brown, *The Biography of Wen T'ien-hsiang in the Sung shih*, unpublished doctoral dissertation, (Harvard University, 1963), two biographies appended to Wen's collected works, one by the Yuan Dynasty scholar Liu Yueh-shen劉岳申, 1260 to circa 1346 (*WWSCC*, 487-494) and the other by Hu Kuang胡廣 (*WWSCC*. 494-505), who lived in the Ming dynasty, from 1370-1418, and Wen T'ien-hsiang's biography in the *CCL*, 21b-29a. The best of the modern biographies appears to be Ume Harakoru's梅原郁 *Bun Ten-so* 文天祥, 1967. Wen was born in 1236, at Chi-shui 吉水, located near modern Chi-an吉安 in Chiang-hsi Province. He was a first place *chin-shih*進士 in 1256 and entered government service soon after. From the very beginning, Wen associated himself with the "War Party" at court and denounced those, including the powerful Chia Ssu-tao賈似道, supporting a more pacifistic approach to Mongol aggression or proposing an abandonment of the capital. While stationed at Kan-chou贛州 in Chiang-hsi in 1275, Wen raised an army partly composed of aboriginals in a vain attempt to stem the Mongol advance along the Yangtse. After an equally unsuccessful attempt to hold Su-chou肅州 for the Sung, Wen entered the walls of Lin-an and became a dominant figure at court during the last few months of resistance. His subsequently career is treated in detail below. On late Sung politics see as an introduction Herbert Franke, "Chia Ssu-tao (1213-1275): A 'Bad Last Minister'?", in Arthur F. Wright and Denis Twitchett, editors, *Confucian Personalities* (Stanford, California, 1962), pp. 217-234, and Jennefer Wei-yen Jay-Preston, *loc. cit.* See also the characterization of Chinese court politics in Ray Huang, *1587: A Year of No Significance* (New Haven and London, 1981), pp. 189ff.

16. See Hsü, *loc. cit.*

17. See, for example, the *WCHTFCIC (WWSCC)*, 505 (biography of Ch'ou Feng鄒風), which may be referring to She.

18. According to the *EWPM* (26), P'u Shou-keng bribed She troops in Chang Shih-chieh's army not to press the siege of Ch'üan-chou, which suggests that many were more interested in money than the loyalist cause. The ease with which some She units changed sides also suggests that many may have been mercenaries or at least unwilling inductees. See below.

19. On the Boat People, not to be confused with the Southeast Asian refugees of recent decades, see Ho Ko-en何格恩, "Tan-chia chih yen-chiu蛋家之研究," *Journal of Oriental Studies*, V (1959-1960), 1-39 (includes an English summary and good maps), E.N. Anderson, Jr., "The Boat People of South China," *Anthropos*, 65 (1970), 248-256, which is reprinted, along with other essays, in the same author's *Essays on South China's Boat People*, Asian Folklore and Social Life Monographs (volume 29), Lou Tsu-k'uang, editor (T'ai-pei, 1972), and the remarks in Schafer, 1967: 52-3, and in Edward H. Schafer, *Shore of Pearls* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1970). For a description of the Tan from the time just before the Sung Resistance Movement see Almut Netolitzky, *Das Ling-wai tai-ta von Chou Ch'u-fei, eine Landeskunde Sudchinas aus dem 12. Jahrhundert*, Munchener Ostasiatische Studien, edited by Wolfgang Bauer and Herbert Franke, Vol. 21 (Wiesbaden, 1977), pp. 50-51.

20. See the *KCFC*, 114, 38A and below.

21. *CPL*, 587; *KTTC*, 3407B-3408A.

22. See in particular, John A. Brim, *Local Systems and Modernizing Change in the New Territories of Hong Kong*, unpublished doctoral dissertation (Stanford University, 1970), and Winston Hsieh, *The Revolution of 1911 in Kwang-tung*, unpublished doctoral dissertation (Harvard University, 1970).

23. On the *tung* in southeastern China see as an introduction Schafer, 1967: 50-69, *passim*, and Schafer, 1970: 56 ff. For references to *tung* in our sources see the *WCHTFCIC*, 508 (biography of P'eng Ch'en-lung彭震龍), for Hu-nan, the *KCFC*, 114, 47, for Kuang-tung, the *HTCTC*, 4994, for Kuang-hsi, and below.

24. See, in particular, Schafer, 1970: 61-2. The majority of *tung* mentioned in our sources in fact appear to be associated with aboriginal groups rather than with Han people. Among the latter the *tung* may in fact have been a relatively recent (late T'ang?) introduction. See below.

25. On the *hsiang* in general see K.C. Hsiao, *Rural China, Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century* (1960), pp. 11-12 and 559-560.

26. See Franke, *op. cit.*, IV (Berlin, 1948), pp. 364-5, for a discussion of the Sung *pao-chia* and *hsiang-ping* 鄉兵 system.

27. On the Sung administrative system see E.A. Kracke, Jr., *Civil Service in Early Sung China, 960-1067* (Cambridge, 1953), pp. 28-53, and Ch'ien Mu, *Traditional Government in Imperial China: A Critical Analysis*, translated by Chun-tu Hsueh and George O. Totten (Hong Kong, 1982), pp. 67-89.

28. *Lu* are mentioned only once in our sources in connection with local militia forces, in the *CSTP*, 82, where it is recorded that when Canton was lost by the loyalists in 1277, "the righteous armies (*i-shih*義師) of the various *lu* no sooner rose than they were suppressed."

29. See Brim, *op. cit.*

30. *FCTC*, 1923A.

31. Eugene N. Anderson, Jr., reports that the Sung Resistance Movement was very much alive in the folklore of the Hong Kong Boat People at the time of his field work there in the 1960s. (Anderson, Personal Communication).

32. The late Willard Jue of Seattle was among those Chinese-Americans proudly tracing their ancestors' connections with the events of the attempted Sung restoration. A Chinese divination book from Boise's Chinese community now in the collection of the Idaho Historical Society includes numerous references to Wen T'ien-hsiang and paraphrases his poems as answers to oracle questions.

33. See as an introduction Hsieh, *op. cit.*

34. On Qubilai's long fight against Qaidu see as an introduction John Dardess, "From Mongol Empire to Yuan Dynasty: Changing Forms of Imperial Rule in Mongolia and Central Asia," *Monumenta Serica*, XXX (1972-1975), 117-165. See also Ch. Dalay, *Yuan gurniy uyeiyn Mongol* (Ulaanbaatar, 1973), pp. 45-55 and *passim*.

35. On the Jurched see M.V. Vorob'yev's excellent *Chjurchjeni i gosudarstvo tszin'* (Moscow, 1975).

36. On the Mongolian Military system in China see as an introduction Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing蕭啓慶, *The Military Establishment of the Yuan Dynasty*, Harvard East Asian Monographs, 77 (Cambridge, 1978).

37. For an excellent, recent discussion of Mongol strategy (as used against the Mamluks) see John Masson Smith, Jr., "'Ayn Jalut: Mamluk Success or Mongol Failure?", *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 44, 2 (Dec. 84), 307-345.

38. Ch'en's biography can be found in the *SS*, 418, 16A-20B. He was a native of Yung-chia永嘉, located across from modern Wen-chou溫州 in Che-chiang. He is said to have come from a poor family and to have risen through literary abilities. He became a major opponent of Chia Ssu-tao at court and replaced the Sung minister after his downfall and death. Ch'en appears, however, to have been somewhat ambivalent in his politics, alternately supporting the "Peace" and "War" Factions, as suited his political needs at the time. Ch'en is a very difficult personality to understand and appears to have beeen somewhat unstable.

39. See the excellent evaluation of Wen in J. Wei-yen Jay-Preston, *op. cit.*, pp. 126ff.

40. P'u, in spite of his importance, lacks a biography either in the *SS* or the *YS* and we, as a consequence, know relatively little about him. The best modern study of him remains Kuwabara Jitsuzo , "On P'u Shou-keng," *Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko*, II (1920), 1-79, and VII (1935), 1-104. Lo Hsiang-lin has incorporated much additional material into his *P'u Shou-keng yen-chiu*蒲壽庚研究 (Hong Kong, 1959), although his use of sources is often highly uncritical. P'u, as his name indicates (Arabic 'Abu), was a descendent of an Islamic (Persian) family that had been resident in China since T'ang times. Although long since sinicized, P'u's family had maintained strong connections with overseas trade, in which it played a major and influential part, and exercized a leadership role within the Middle Eastern merchant colony in Fu-chien. Because of these associations, P'u came to dominate the administration of overseas trade and coast defense in his native Ch'üan-chou in late Sung times.

41. *Shih-po shih* were first appointed in T'ang times for each of the major ports permitted to carry on overseas trade. Holders of the office were responsible for local customs, administration of foreign trading settlements on Chinese soil (*shih-po shih* were in fact often the established leaders of these settlements, as in the case of P'u Shou-keng) and the maintenance of a long range trade that was lucrative for all concerned. On the office See Kuwabara, *op. cit.*, 5 ff.

42. Literary remains of Sung loyalists in general, including those not actually participating in open resistance to the Mongols, are well surveyed in Jennefer Wei-yen Jay-Preston, *op. cit.*

43. See as an introduction to the complicated Subject of Sung loyalism in Yuan times F.W. Mote, "Confucian Eremitism in the Yuan Period," in Arthur F. Wright, editor, *The Confucian Persuasion* (Stanford, 1960), pp. 202-240, and Jennefer Wei-yen Jay-Preston, *op. cit.*, which also contains a brief general account of the major events of the resistance movement itself.

44. *Journal of Oriental Studies*, III (1956), 185-217.

45. See pages 342ff.

46. Chien Yu-wen簡又文, "Sung-mou erh ti nan ch'ien nien-lu k'ao宋末二帝南遷錄考," *SHTCNC*, 122-174 (also published separately).

47. Jao Tsung-i饒宗頤, *Chiu-lung yü Sung chi shih-liao*九龍與宋季史料, Hong Kong, 1959. See also the treatment in Lo Hsiang-lin *et al.*, *I-pa-ssu-erh nien i-ch'ien chih Hsiang-kang chi ch'i tui-wai chiao-t'ung*一八四二年以前之香港及其對外交通 (Hong Kong, 1959).

48. Resistance activities in other parts of China not directly connected with the movement at the court of the Sung pretenders in the south is discussed in Jay-Preston, *op. cit.*

49. Prince Shih was the eldest son of Tu-tsung by Yang Shu-i楊淑妃 and was born (according to the *CSTP*, 81) in the fourth year of the Hsien-shun咸淳 era (1269-70). When Tu-tsung died, many members of the court wished to establish Shih as his successor, but this was opposed by Chia Ssu-tao and Prince Shih's younger brother by a primary consort of Tu-tsung, the later Emperor Kung-tsung恭宗 (r. 1275-1276), was established instead as a concession to Chinese conceptions of legitimacy (*SS*, 47, 22b). Prince Ping was the son of Emperor Tu-tsung and Yü Hsiu-yung俞修容 and was born in the seventh year of the same period, 1272-3 (*CSTP*, 82).

50. *SS*, *loc. cit.*

51. *Ibid.*

52. That is, Hsieh t'ai-hou謝太后, the widow of Tu-tsung and mother of Kung-tsung.

53. *SS*, 23a.

54. *Ibid.*

55. See Fan's biography in the *HYS*, 6958.2-.3.

56. On the flight of the two princes and their supporters from Lin-an see the *SS*, 47, 23A, *CHYSC*, 37-8 and the *CSTP*, 81. The *EWPM*, 23, says incorrectly that the two princes went entirely by sea from Lin-an to Fu-chou.

57. Su's biography can be found in the *KTTC*, 186, 3405A (the text reproduces a now lost portion of the *Yai-shan chih*). He was a man of Ching-hu荊湖, that is, the general area around Lake Tung-t'ing洞庭, and had made his reputation as a military man.

58. Lu's biography can be found in the *SS*, 451, 10B-12B. Ch'u-chou was located on the Yun-ho River west of Yung-chia. Lu was a *chin-shih* in 1260. The sources underscore the fact that he came to the princes on his own initiative and was the first to propose summoning Chang Shih-chieh and Ch'en I-chung, with their forces, marking the real beginning of the attempted restoration. Later, like Wen T'ien-hsiang, Lu had his difficulties with Ch'en. Chang Shih-chieh acted as an intermediator between the two men and prevented an outright rupture, although Lu was briefly exiled to Ch'ao-chou in Kuang-tung. Lu later played a major role in creating a court and a government at Fu-chou and was instrumental in putting the resistance movement on a firm organizational basis. During later difficulties he helped prevent a total breakdown of the movement and during the last battles Lu was responsible for detailed organization of the Yai-shan water-fortress.

59. On these events see the *SS*, 47, 23A-B, *CSTP*, 81, *EWPM*, 23, *CHYSC*, 39, and the biographies of Su, Lu, Chang and Ch'en. See also the *HTCTC*, 4976-7, on the withdrawal of Chang and Ch'en from the capital.

60. According to the *SS*, 47, 23A-B, the Hsiu-wang秀王 ("Accomplished Prince") [Chao] Yü-i [趙]與訔, who had been ordered by the Empress-Mother Hsieh to accompany the two young pretenders, and Chao Chi-fu趙吉甫 were sent to Fu-chien with these orders. Only the former is mentioned by the *CSTP*, 81.

61. On these events see the *SS*, *loc. cit.*, *EWPM*, 23, *CHYSC*, 39, and the relevant individual biographies.

62. *HTCTC*, 4982. See also the *SS*, 47, 23B, *EWPM*, 24, *CSTP*, 81.

63. Loyalist sources make it appear that the people of Fu-chien were eager to accept the invitation of the two princes to continue resistance, but this was far from the case. According to the biography of Ch'en Wen-lung 陳文龍 (the uncle of loyalist Ch'en Ts'an) in the *FCTC*, 1922A-B, the consensus favored surrendering the region to the Mongols, and Ch'en is said to have actually submitted a memorial suggesting that the party of refugees return to the capital, but received no reply.

64. *HTCTC*, 4982, *YS*, 155, 3664 (biography of Li Ko 李恪).

65. *HTCTC*, *loc. cit.*

66. For the date see the *CHYSC*, 40, *SS*, 47, 23B, etc.

67. See the *EWPM*, 24.

68. The *EWPM*, 24, also claims that Hsieh Fang-te 謝枋得 was dispatched to recover Jao-chou 饒州 in Chiang-tung *lu*. This could not have been the case, since Hsieh had already surrendered to the Yuan. See Hsieh's biography in the *SS*, 425.

69. *HTCTC*, 182, 4977. *WWSCC*, 499, 490. The *CCL*, 25A, dates Wen's arrival in Fu-chou as occuring on the 6th day of the 6th Month, i.e., on July 18, almost two weeks later. Such a dating is not supported by the internal evidence of the sources as a whole. Any conflict may, however, be eliminated if we assume that the *CCL* is providing the date of Wen's appearance at court to receive appointment as Junior Minister rather than that of his initial arrival.

70. *SS*, 47, 23A, *HTCTC*, 4985. Other members of the loyalist government included Lu Hsiu-fu and Su Liu-i.

71. *HTCTC*, 4986. *WWSCC*, 499, *HTCTC*, 4986 and 4990, *CHYSC*, 41.

72. *EWPM*, 24.

73. *CCL*, 25A.

74. See for example the evaluation of conflict between the three loyalist ministers in the *CHYSC*, 41.

75. Li's biography can be found in the *YS*, 129, 3155-9, and his *miao-pei* 廟碑 in the *YWL*, 21, 257-260. Li was of Tangut extraction and his surname was originally a gift from the T'ang ruling house. His family had served the Mongols for several generations.

76. *YS*, 129, 3157.

77. Wu Chun has no *SS* biography. On his campaigns see the *HTCTC*, 4986, 4988, *SS*, 47, 24A-B, the *CHTC*, 95, 38B-39A and the *YS*, 129, *loc. cit.* Wu was among those sent north by the loyalist government in Fu-chou in July in a largely unproductive effort to penetrate Che-tung lu (Wu was appointed *Che-tung chao-yü shih* 浙東招諭使 ["Che-tung Mobilization Officer"]. By August he had turned his attentions to central Chiang-hsi and had made a successful penetration to Kuang-ch'ang 廣昌, where he raised troops and was able to recover surrounding *hsien* for the Sung cause The arrival of Li Heng's army, however, quickly made Wu's position untenable and forced his retreat. Only massive reinforcements (the biography of Li Heng, *YS*, *loc. cit*, speaks of a reinforced army of 100,000) allowed Wu to resume the offensive later in the autumn.

78. The advance into Chiang tung-lu was led by Ti Kuo-hsiu 羅國秀, who advanced to Ch'ien-shan 玉山, the advance into Che-tung by Fu Cho 傅卓, who took the counties (*hsien*) of Ch'ü 衢 and Hsin 信. Both advances, the *SS*, (47, 24A-B; see also the *HTCTC*, 4988) notes, met with considerable popular response but could not be maintained after the arrival of Li Heng's army and the defeat of Wu Chun further south. The movement of Tung Wen-

ping's army from the vicinity of the Sung capital may have upset loyalist plans as well. As a result, Ti fell back and Fu surrendered.

79. A-la-han was a Jalayir Mongol, a member of the imperial bodyguard and commanded a myriarchy during the invasion of Sung. See his biography in the *YS*, 129, 3147-9.

80. Tung was one of the many north Chinese allies of the Mongols, and had a reputation as a moderate. He preferred, for example, to take the south with as little bloodshed as possible so as to establish a firm basis for Yuan rule in the newly conquered domains. He carried out this policy with great success in a number of campaigns, including that against the Sung pretenders in 1276. See his biographies in the *YCMCSL*, 14, 223-230, and the *YS*, 156, 3667-9.

81. *YS*, 129, 3157-8 (biography of Li Heng). Note that the reference is misplaced in Li's biography.

82. See *YSC*, 31.

83. *SS*, 47, 24B, *HTCTC*, 4993.

84. *YS*, 156, 3672-3. (see also *HTCTC*, 4994, the *EWPM*, 24, and the *YSC*, 31, on A-la-han's fleet; the fleet, under the operational command of A-la-han, was actually commanded by the former Sung official Wang Shih-ch'iang.

85. *SS*, 47, 25A, *CHYSC*, 43, *EWPM*, 24, *HTCTC*, 4994.

86. *YSC*, 31

87. *EWPM*, 24-25.

88. *CHYSC*, 43, *SS*, 47, 24B, 451, 13A-15A (biography of Ch'en Wen-lung), *FCTC*, 1922A-B (biography of Ch'en Wen-lung). Ch'en Wen-lung was sent to restablish order after both uprisings.

89. According to the *HTCTC*, 183, on the day of Prince Shih's enthronement, June 15, 1276, a severe earthquake had suddenly collapsed some seven *li*, about two miles, of the southern city wall. It is unlikely that the damage could have been fully repaired by December, and loyalists may thus have been forced to abandon Fu-chou.

90. *CHYSC*, 43, *EWPM*, 24-5, *YSC*, 31, *HTCTC*, 4995, *SS*, 47, 25B.

91. According the *YS* (9, 180) the Yuan government had already sent an envoy to P'u and his brother in late February or early March. Nothing is mentioned about any agreement at that time.

92. *EWPM*, 25.

93. *SS*, 47, 25B, *HTCTC*, 4995.

94. The *FCTC* (6, 51b), on the other hand, suggests that the slaughter of the Chao clansmen actually took place in 1277, when Chang Shih-chieh besieged Ch'üan-chou to avenge P'u's earlier rebuff of the loyalist cause, and that P'u had good reason to take action against them: "The forces of Chang were very strong. When they heard of his arrival many members of the imperial house in Ch'üan-chou assembled a force of more than a myriad to greet the army of the princes. But P'u Shou-keng closed the city, held it, and in three days killed all Chao clansmen not of the imperial house." P'u is stereotyped as a complete villain in most of the sources, and the assertion that he slaughtered members of the Chao clan in 1276 out of pique may he part of the hostile tradition against him.

95. *SS*, *loc. cit.*, *HTCTC*, *loc. cit.*

96. *SS*, 47, 25B-26A.

97. *YS*. 156, 3673. This tally was Tung's emblem of office and giving it to P'u was a most serious act indeed, thus Tung's concern with the possible anger of Qubilai.

98. According to Li K'o's biography in the *YS* (155, 3663-4), much of what is now Kuang-hsi and portions of southwest-

ern Kuang-tung were already under Mongol influence if not control by the summer of 1276, primarily due to the presence of Ariq-qaya's army in Hu-nan.

99. See his biographies in the *YCMCSL*, 2, 26-29, and in the *YS*, 128, 3124-3128.

100. *KTTC*, 186, 3395A.

101. On the various approach routes to Canton see Hsü, Kuo and Hsü, *op. cit.*, 6.

102. *SS*, 47, 24A, *YSC*, 31, *HTCTC*, 5988, *KTTC*, 3395A-B. Of the various generals sent by Hsü to resist Liang Hsiung-fei, only Huang Chun 黃俊, a man from Nan-hai hsien 南海縣, located just across from Canton, put up serious resistance. After the fall of Canton, the former "loyalist" generals were all offered office and all except Huang entered Yuan service. His former colleagues had him killed as a result. See the fragment of the *Yai-shan chih* quoted in the *KTTC*, 186, 3395A, and Huang's biography in the *KCFC*, 114, 44A.

103. See his biography in the *KCFC*, 114, 44b-45a.

104. *SWTCNC*, 76 (quoting the 1878 edition of the *Tung-huan hsien-chih* 東莞縣志). Hsiung's biography in the *KCFC* implies that Hsiung raised his troops only after the invasion of Kuang-tung by Liang and Huang, but this is corrected by the editor of the *Tung-huan hsien-chih*, drawing upon additional source material.

105. *KCFC*, 114, 44b. See also the *SS*, 47, 24B. A slightly different version of these events is found in the *KCFC* biography of the Canton loyalist Chao Pi-hsiang 趙必瑔. Chao came from the same area as Hsiung, but unlike Hsiung was a member of the gentry, having taken his *chin-shih* degree in 1265. He returned home after military service just at the time that Hsiung was raising troops and found him ready to confiscate the wealth of the local populace to support his forces. Advising Hsiung against this, lest a local rebellion ensue, Chao then contributed support for Hsiung's men from his own resources and thereby reduced the obligations of local people. Chao then proposed to Hsiung that since the Sung pretenders were sending Chao Chin and Fang Hsing to recover Kuang-tung he should first raise the Sung banner before he set his troops in motion. Hsiung took the advice. The exactions of Hsiung Fei to support his army are also mentioned in the biography of Li Ch'un-sou 李春叟 (*KCFC*, 114, 34b-35a), where draconian measures are recorded, and in that of Ti Kang 程鉅 (*KCFC*, 114, 45a).

106. *KCFC*, *loc. cit.*, *YSC*, 31.

107. *SS*, 47, 24B.

108. *SS*, 47, 25A.

109. *YSC*, 31, *SS*, 47, 24B-25A, *KCFC*, *loc. cit.*, *KTTC*, 3395B-3396A.

110. A short biography of Lu can be found in the *HYS*, 177. Unfortunately, Lu's activities in Kuang-tung in 1276 are not mentioned there.

111. Biography in the *YS*, 166, 3904-6.

112. *KCFC*, 114, 44b, *SS*, 47, 25A, *CHYSC*, 43, *YSC*, 31, *HTCTC*, 4994, *KTTC*, 3395B-3396A, *WCHTFCIC*, 511.

113. *KCFC*, 114, 44B. A short biography of Hsiao can be found in the *WCHTFCIC*, 511. Hsiao's connection with Wen T'ien-hsiang, implied by the inclusion of his biography in the latter source, is uncertain.

114. *KCFC*, *loc. cit.*, *KTTC*, 3396A, *CHYSC*, *loc. cit.*, *YSC*, *loc. cit.*, *YS*, 165, 3875 (biography of Chou Ch'uan).

115. *CHYSC*, *loc. cit.*, *YSC*, *loc. cit.*

116. *YSC*, *loc. cit.*, *WCHTFCIC*, *loc. cit.*

117. *KTTC*, 3396A.

118. *KTTC*, *loc. cit.*, *HTCTC*, 4996, *SS*, 47, 25B, *YSC*, 31.

119. The walls of Canton stopped well short of the Pearl River in the south, possibly to avoid any possible flood or tide damage to them. The area was, nonetheless, an important part of the city, since much of Canton's commerce was concentrated there. For a map of the Sung city see Hsü, Kuo and Hsü, *op. cit.*, 14.

120. *YSC*, 31-2, *CHYSC*, 44, *KTTC*, *loc. cit.*

121. *YSC*, *loc. cit.*

122. *SS*, 47, 26A, *YSC*, 32 *CHYSC*, 44.

123. Chang's biography can be found in the *KCFC*, 114, 38a-42b It includes several long excerpts from Chang's writings, and is followed by a short account of his family which originally migrated to Kuang-tung from Ssu-ch'uan. Some sources assign Chang to Shun-te hsien 順德縣 to the immediate southeast of P'an-yu), but the *KCFC*, drawing upon the Chang family *tsu-p'u* correctly assigns him to P'an-yu.

124. On the appointment see the *KTTC*, 3396B, *CHYSC*, 44. The *YSC* (32) mentions only the military appointment.

125. Ling's biography follows that of Wang Fu-tao in the *KCFC*, 114, 38A-B. Ling was a man of P'u-t'ien 蒲田 near modern Amoy in Fu-chien and had taken his *chin-shih* sometime between 1241 and 1253. He had originally come to Kuang-tung as an official in the Sung government.

126. *KTTC*, 3396B, *CHYSC*, 44.

127. *CHYSC*, *loc. cit.*, *YSC*, *loc. cit.*, *KTTC*, *loc. cit.*, *KCFC*, 114, 42A-B (biography of Chang Chen-sun).

128. See his biography in the *YS*, 165, 3874-5.

129. *YS*, 165, 3875.

130. *YSC*, 32, *KTTC*, 3396B.

131. *SS*, 47, 26A, *YS*, 9, 187, *YSC*, 32, *KTTC*, 3396B, *HTCTC*, 5000.

132. *SS*, 47, *loc. cit.* But according to the same source (*loc. cit.*) the city returned to loyalist allegiance a few days later, perhaps after the departure of Hu-lu-yun.

133. *SS*, 47, 26A.

134. *YS*, 9, 188. Nan-en fell on March 8.

135. *SS*, 47, 26A.

136. The island is located immediately to the west of the main island of Hong Kong. See Chien Yu-wen, *op. cit.*, pp. 130 ff. See also *YSC*, 32, *CHYSC*, 44, *HAHC*, 56.

137. For a good account of the alleged plot from the prospective of Mongke's party, see 'Ala-ad-Din 'Ata-Malik Juvaini, *The History of the World-Conqueror*, two volumes, trans. by J.A. Boyle (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1958), II, pp. 573-590.

138. *YS*, 156, 3673.

139. See Dardess, *op. cit.*, Dalay, *op. cit.*, 45-55 and *passim*.

140. According to the *SS*, 26A, Mei-chou was recaptured sometime during the third lunar month of 1277 (April 5-May 4).

141. *SS*, 47, 23B, *CHYSC*, 40-41.

142. *SS*, 47, 25A.

143. *CHYSC*, 43, *SS*, 418, 24B (biography of Wen T'ien-hsiang), *WWSCC*, 490, 499.

144. Chao lacks a biography in the *SS*; see, however, the short sketch in the *WCHTFCIC*, 505. He was a man of Ho-chou, located in what is now the east-central portion of An-hui Province.

145. *CCL*, 25B, *SS*, *loc. cit.*, *WWSCC*, 490-491, 499.

146. *WWSCC, loc. cit., SS, loc. cit.* (biography of Wen T'ien-hsiang), *CHTC*, 95, 38B.

147. *CCL*, 25B.

148. *EWPM*, 25, *SS*, 418, 25A.

149. *CCL. loc. cit., SS, loc. cit.* (biography of Wen T'ien-hsiang), *WWSCC*, 490-491, 499.

150. *SS*, 47, 26A.

151. Biography in the *YS*, 129, 3150-55. So-tu was a Jalayir Mongol and had served in Qubilai's bodyguard.

152. *WWSCC*, 490-1, 499.

153. *SS*, 47, 26A.

154. See his biography in the *CCL*, 40B-41B.

155. *SS*, 47, 26A.

156. *SS, loc. cit.*

157. *SS*, 47, 26B.

158. *SS*, 418, 25A biography of Wen T'ien-hsiang), *WWSCC*, 491, 499-500, *SS*, 47, 26A-27A (*passim*), *CHYSC*, 44-5, *EWPM*, 25-6, *CSTP*, 82, *CHTC*, 95, 39A-B.

159. See the detailed list of persons rising in support of Wen's advance in the *WWSCC*, 500. See also the biographies in the *WCHTFCIC*, 505 ff.

160. *YS*, 129, 3157.

161. *SS*, 47, 26B, *YSC*, 32, *CHYSC*, 45, *EWPM*, 26, *CSTP*, 82, *SS*, 451, 9A (biography of Chang Shih-chieh), *FCTC*, 6, 51B and the *CCHC*, 86.

162. *FCTC*, 51B. See note 94.

163. The fall of Chang to the loyalists is not mentioned but since it had to be recovered later by So-tu it must also have come under Sung control during Chang's advance. See the *CSTP*, 82.

164. *SS*, 47, 6B.

165. Biography in the *FCTC*, 1925A. Wang was a man of Fu-ning on the northern coast of Fu-chien and began in Sung service, but then went on to a distinguished career under the Yuan. His duplicity at the time of Chang Shih-chieh's invasion in 1277 is perhaps best understood in terms of the earthquake damaged walls of his city and the difficulty that he would have faced in defending them.

166. *SS*, 47, 26B.

167. *FCTC, loc. cit.*

168. At some undetermined time Wen-chou was recovered. See the *YS*, 132, 3216 (biography of Ho-la-tai 哈剌解).

169. On Kuan-fu Ch'ang see Chien Yu-wen, *op. cit.*, 136ff.

170. See Chien Yu-wen, *loc. cit.*

171. *YSC*, 32, *CHYSC*, 44.

172. Chien Yu-wen, *loc. cit.*

173. *Ibid.* See also Lo, 1956. On loyalist activities in the Kowloon area see *CHYSC*, 44, *YSC*, 32, *THHC*, 77, *HAHC*, 56.

174. In the *SS* (47, 26B), Li's move against Wen is listed after August 18, when Chang began his siege of Ch'üan-chou, and before August 31, the first day of the eighth lunar month.

175. *CSTP*, 82.

176. *SS*, 47, 27A, *YSC*, 32. The *CCL*'s (25B) 17th day of the 8th lunar month is apparently an error for the 27th day of the 8th lunar month.

177. The fullest account of the confused movements leading up to the Battle at K'ung-k'eng and Wen's subsequent flight is in the *WWSCC*, 500. See also the *CHYSC*, 45, *CCL*, 25B-26A.

178. *CCL*, 26A.

179. See, in particular, *WWSCC*, 500.

180. *EWPM*, 26.

181. *Ibid.*

182. T'a-ch'u's biography can be found in the *YS*, 135, 3273-5.

183. *YS*, 129, 3151, *HTCTC*, 5006, *YS*, 9, 192.

184. *HTCTC, loc. cit.*

185. *YS*, 129, 3151-3.

186. *YS*, 129, 3152.

187. *Ibid.*

188. *FCTC*, 51B.

189. *SS*, 47, 27A.

190. *SS*, 47, 27A. Note that the month is given incorrectly but the day --*chia-ch'en* 甲辰 -- correctly. There was no *chia-ch'en* day in the 10th lunar month.

191. See, however, *YS*, 163, 3831-3832 (biography of Wu-ku-sun tse).

192. *YS*, 129, 3152. See also the *EWPM*, 26, which dates the fall of the city to the *chia-ch'en* day of the 11th lunar month, i.e. the 15th of December. This is far too late. So-tu had already departed by Sea for Kuang-tung by that time.

193. *YS*, 129, 3152.

194. See his biography in the *YS*, 129, 3153-5.

195. *YS*, 129, 152, 3155. The text of Pai-chia-nu's biography implies that it was he, rather than this father, who relieved Ch'üan-chou and took ship south. So-tu himself seems to have advanced overland.

196. *SS*, 47, 27A, YSC, 32.

197. *YS*, 129, 3155.

198. *YS*, 129, 3152. The *YSC* (32) dates So-tu's first attack on Ch'ao-chou to the 10th lunar month, October 28 to November 26, 1277.

199. *YS*, 163, 3832 (biography of Wu-ku-sun Tse)烏古孫澤.

200. *CSTP*, 82.

201. *YS*, 129, 3152.

202. *YSC*, 32.

203. *PSL*, 558. The commander of the Sung forces is not mentioned.

204. *HTCTC*, 5007. "T'a-ch'u consequently destroyed Canton City." See also the *KTTC*, 3397A.

205. *CSTP*, 82.

206. *YS*, 129, 3152 (biography of So-tu), 3155 (biography of Pai-chia-nu), *CHYSC*, 46, *EWPM*, 26, *CSTP*, 82 and the *KTTC*, 3397A-B. See also the *CCC*, 86-7, and the biography of Ma Fa 馬發, the defender of Ch'ao-chou, in the *KTTC*, 5034A.

207. *SS*, 47, 27B, *YSC*, 32. See, however, the account of the *PSL* (558), which seems to confuse events of 1277 with events of 1278.

208. On the movements of the loyalist fleet during this period see Chien Yu-wen, *op. cit.*, 151-157. Both the *YSC* (32) and the *CHYSC* (46) simply date the move of the loyalist fleet to its anchorage off Ch'ao-chou to the ninth lunar month (September 29-October 27, 1277), without being more specific. The move probably took place in early October, before news of So-tu's counterattack reached the Sung court. Chang Shih-chieh returned to the fleet after it had already moved to the Ch'ao-chou anchorage, probably at the very end of the ninth lunar month, allowing several days to sail the approximately 200 miles from Ch'üan-chou to Ch'ao-chou.

209. *YSC*, 32, *CHYSC*, 46, *CSTP*, 82.

210. On Hsiu-shan see Chien Yu-wen, *op. cit.*, 157.

211. The *SS* (47, 27A) lists Liu Shen's attack on the Sung fleet at Ch'ien-wan 潛灣 and the move to Hsiu-shan after the fall of Canton, which took place on December 1. The loyalist fleet probably arrived at its new anchorage sometime during the first or second week of December, 1277.

212. See Chien Yu-wen, *op. cit.*, 162. Ching-ao was on Ta heng-ch'in 大橫琴 Island.

213. *SS*, 47, 27A.

214. *HTCTC*, 5007.

215. *SS, loc. cit.* The *SS* says 4-5 out of every 10 were killed by the storm.

216. *SS*, 47, 27A, *YSC*, 32, *CHYSC*, 46.

217. *SS*, 47, *loc. cit.*, *YSC*, 32-33, *CHYSC*, 46. It is unclear when the court withdrew to K'ang-chou, but it was after the first day of the first lunar month of the 15th year of *Chih-yuan* (January 25, 1278), since the *CHYSC, loc. cit.*, specifically states that the emperor was still in the Canton Delta (at Hsieh-nü hsia 謝女峽 on an island near Macao) at that time. This reference, however, is immediately followed by a reference to Chang Shih-chieh's first attack on Lei-chou, suggesting that the move to K'ang-chou took place soon after. See also the *SS*, 47, 27B. The *HTCTC* (5012) places the move to K'ang-chou in the third lunar month, i.e. sometime between March 25 and April 23. This is certainly too late.

218. See his biography in the *KCFC*, 1144, 43B-44A. Ma was a man of Hsiang-shan hsien. His daughter later became the concubine of Prince Ping, when the latter became emperor after the death of Prince Shih. Ma supported the loyalists throughout 1277 and 1278, and after the final Sung defeat at Yai-shan raised troops to continue the struggle, but was defeated and killed by the Mongols.

219. *KCFC, loc. cit.*

220. *SS*, 451, 20A. The *CSTP* (82) suggests that it was Chang Shih-chieh, rather than Ch'en, who first proposed moving to Champa.

221. *SS*, 451, 11B.

222. *KTTC*, 3397B-3398B, *SS*, 47, 27B.

223. *PSL*, 558. Quite possibly Boat People were to be used to deliver supplies to the loyalists. On their importance on Hai-nan and in Hai-nan's trade with the mainland see E.H. Schafer, *Shore of Pearls*, pp. 68ff.

224. *SS*, 47, 27B.

225. *SS, loc. cit.*

226. *SS*, 451, 11B. See also the *CSTP*, 82, *YSC*, 33, *CHYSC*, 47, *EWPM*, 26, *PSL*, 558. Only the recovery in Kuang-tung seems to have saved the resistance movement at this point.

227. *SS*, 47, 27B.

228. See his biography in the *KCFC*, 114, 38A-B.

229. *SS*, 47, 27B.

230. *SS*, 47, 27B-28A, *YSC*, 33-4, *HCYSC*, 46-7, *EWPM*, 26-7, *CSTP*, 82-3, *KTTC*, 3397B-3399A, *PSL*, 558, *SS*, 418, 26A (biography of Wen T'ien-hsiang), *WWSCC*, 491-2, 500-501, *WCHTFCIC, passim.*

231. See his biography in the *YCMCSL*, 6, 8-86, and in the *YS*, 156, 3679-84. Chang came from a northern military family which had long supported the Mongols. In the campaign of 1278-9, he was given command of both Chinese and Mongolian forces, an exceptional appointment.

232. *YS*, 135, 3274, 156, 3682, 129, 3158, *PSL*, 558.

233. *YSC*, 34, *CHYSC*, 48.

234. *CSTP*, 83.

235. *SS*, 418, 26A, *WSCC*, 491, 500, *CHYSC*, 84. See also the biographies in the *WCHTFCIC*.

236. *SS*, 418, 26A-B, *WWSCC*, 491, 500-501. These same brothers Ch'en had surrendered to Ho-la-tai with their She army when Pai-chia-nu moved down the coast in late 1277. See the *YS*, 132, 3216, 14B.

237. *YS*, 129, 158, *SS*, 47, 8A.

238. *SS*, 47, 8A, *YSC*, 34, *CHYSC*, 49, *KCFC*, 114, 38A.

239. *YS*, 129, 158, *SS. loc. cit.*, *YSC*, *loc. cit.*, *CHYSC*, *loc. cit.*, *KCFC*, *loc. cit.*

240. *SS*, 47, 28A, *YS*, 156, 3682, *SS*, 418, 26B, *WWSCC*, 492, 501.

241. *CCL*, 26A-B.

242. *CCL*, 26B.

243. *PSL*, 558.

244. This inlet is formed by the Main Island of Yai-shan and the mainland of Hsin-hui hsien, and is located just south of Hsin-hui.

245. Accounts of the site, the Sung disposition and the subsequent battle can be found in the following sources: *PSL*, 558-9 (in the most detail), *YS*, 156, 3683 (biography of Chang Hung-fan), *YS*, 129, 3158 (biography of Li Heng), *YCMCSL*, 84-5 (biography of Chang Hung-fan), *SS*, 47, 28A-29A, *YSC*, 34-5, *CHYSC*, 50-51, *EWPM*, 28, *CSTP*, 83, *CCL*, 45A-48A. The account given below largely follows the *PSL*, except where noted.

246. There is considerable disagreement in our sources regarding the number of Sung ships at Yai-shan. The *SS*, 47, 28B, speaks of "more than 1,000 large warships" at the beginning of the battle. This would seem to be contradicted by the *PSL* (558), which credits the Sung with only 700 large ships at the beginning of the battle. The same source (559), however, records the capture of 800 large vessels after the battle, and this after many had been lost or had fled. The *SS* figure thus appears to be reliable. The figure of 1,000 large warships does not include the many small vessels manned by Boat People and other locals at the battle. For a contemporary description of the large Chinese junk of the era see Marco Polo, *op. cit.*, 241.

247. *EWPM, loc. cit., CCL, loc. cit.*

248. *SS*, 451, 9B, *CCL, loc. cit.*

249. See his article, "Maritime Commerce and its Relation to the Sung Navy," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, XII (1969), 1, 57-101.

250. *SS*, 47, 28A.

251. *EWPM*, 28, *PSL*, 558-9.

252. *PSL*, 558.

253. On the *huo-p'ao* see Lynn White, *Medieval Technology and Social Change*, pp. 102-3. Such machines could throw 200-300 pounds as far as 300 yards, or a smaller load a somewhat greater distance.

254. *YS*, 156. 3683. See also the *PSL*, 558.

255. *PSL, loc. cit.* This reference implies that the Sung ships were equipped with rather sophisticated pumping equipment to provide adequate water pressure for fire fighting. On Chinese ships and ship building during the Sung see Needham, Wang Ling and Lu Gwei-djen, *op. cit.*, pp. 460ff. See Needham's discussion of the passage under discussion on page 667.

256. *EWPM*. 28. According to the *Yai-shan chih (KTTC*, 3399B), the Yuan fleet was commanded by Umar (Wu-ma-erh).

257. On the enlistment of defeated Sung troops and sailors by the Yuan government see Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing, *op. cit.*, 18.

258. On Chang's escape and later activities see, in particular, *YSC*, 35-6.

259. According to figures given in D. Perkins, *Agricultural Development in China, 1368-1968*, p. 195, the population of Kuang-tung (modern boundaries) numbered 526,913 households or about 2,600,000 persons (using the usual five persons per household conversion rate) in 1173. Perkins (*loc. cit.*) claims 681,477 households or about 3,600,000 persons for Kuang-tung during early Yuan times (circa 1270 or 1290), indicating a substantial rise in the population (or at least the registered population) over about 120 years. However, there are problems with Perkins' figure for circa 1290. In particular, *KTTC* (1753A) gives the figure of 681,477 households as the population of Kuang-tung in the first year of *Chih-yuan*, i.e. 1264, twelve years before Mongol armies entered the area.

If this is correct then the figure given by Perkin's for "1290" actually represents the late Sung population, before the conquest of Kuang-tung by the Mongols, and before the impact of the Sung resistance movement was felt. Thus the figure of 675,599 familes, i.e. 5,878 families less than in 1264, given by Perkins for 1393, can be taken, together with the 1264 figures, as an indication of the magnitude of the losses occasioned in Kuang-tung by the Sung resistance movement, i.e., instead of an expected population gain of perhaps 40-45% in 129 years (1264-1393) we encounter a population decline of slightly under one percent.

Even assuming a slower Kuang-tung population growth rate between 1264 and 1393, if the figures for 1264 and 1393 are reasonably accurate in terms of approximate demographic magnitudes, and embody the same degree and kinds of error (total undercount, understatement of the number of females, under-enumeration of aboriginal groups etc.), we must assume a population loss of at least 20% (i.e. 700,000 persons) and more likely nearly 30% in Kuang-tung after 1264 to account for the 1393 figures. The only event that could have caused losses of such magnitude was the Sung Resistance Movement. Kuang-tung (along with much of Fu-chien and eastern Chiang-hsi) must thus be added to Perkins' "areas of greatest Mongol devastation."

260. The *KTTC* (3406A-3410B, *passim*) and the contemporary *CPL* contain the following information on revolts, uprisings and aboriginal wars in Kuang-tung and surrounding areas in the period after the Sung Resistance movement:

1. In 1281-1282, Li Tzu李梓 of Nan-hai hsien南海縣 raised troops, and used the Sung *nien-hao* 年號("year period"). Troops had to be sent from outside Kuang-tung to put down the rebellion. (*KTTC*, 3407A).

2. In the third month of 1283-84, Lin Kuei-fang林桂芳 and Chao Liang-ch'ien趙良鈐 raised troops, called themselves the Lo-p'ing羅平 Nation and used the *nien-hao* Yen-k'ang延康. Both were from Hsin-hui hsien. Although the revolt was soon suppressed, other similar outbreaks followed (*KTTC*, 3407A-B). See also the *CSTP*, 84, where there is a short biography of Chao, here called Chao Liang-ch'ien趙良嶔. Chao was the son of a member of the Chao clan who had come to Kuang-tung in the train of the loyalist princes. He fled to Hai-nan island after the Battle of Yai-shan and remained hidden there, changing his surname to Lin林. The same source also notes general persecution of Chao clansmen in Kuang-tung after the revolt and contains a very interesting reference to the formation of a lineage estate, called Chao-tzu, "Sons of Chao," by Lin Kuei-fang's father to support the Chao lineage in the face of persecution.

3. There were general uprisings, possibily related to the earlier Lo-p'ing revolt in 1283 and 1284. In the ninth month of 1283, "robbers" arose and 10,000 troops had to be sent to put them down. The next year "robbers" threatened supply lines of Mongol troops assaulting Champa and had to be suppressed (*KTTC*, 3407B).

4. Apparently in the same year, Ou Nan-hsi歐南喜 of Nan-hai hsien南海縣 and Li Te黎德 of Hsin-hui hsien raised a force of about 100,000 and revolted. They received the support of a number of individuals identified only by their surnames and the title *ta-lao*大老, "elder," possibly indicative of secret society participation in the uprising. The rebels took several cities and towns, including Tseng-ch'eng增城 in the east delta and its *hsien*, established a *nien-hao*, organized a government with each major participant receiving the title *wang*王, "prince." A general movement of Boat People supported the uprising and 10,000 troops brought in by the Yuan government from as far as Chiang-hsi were unable to contain it (*CPL*, 587). The rebels gained control of Ch'ing-yuan hsien清遠縣, and an attempt on Canton was barely defeated. The end came in a great naval battle in which 7,000 rebel vessels (presumably manned by Boat People) and some 200,000 rebel troops were defeated by a much smaller Yuan force in about 400 ships (*KTTC*, 3407B-3408A).

5. In the third month of 1285, "Ch'en I-chung and Prince Ping were captured." The *KTTC* (3408A) dryly informs us that these men were imposters, since both men were by then dead.

6. Later the same year, a man named Chang Ch'iang張鎗 of Tung-huan hsien raised over 20,000 troops, and started a rebellion to restore the Sung. It was quickly suppressed (*KTTC*, 3408B).

261. We are fortunate in possessing several accounts of Kuang-tung under later Mongol rule. See, for example, Edward H. Schafer, "A Fourteenth Century Gazeteer of Canton," in *Oriente Poliano* (Rome, 1957), 67-93. Schafer, however, seriously understates the degree of damage caused by the Mongol conquest, and his translation of the gazeteer must be read accordingly.

262. In one part of the New Territories of Hong Kong, for example, the Dragon Boat Festival is interpreted in terms of the battle between Sung and Yuan. See Chien Yu-wen, *op. cit.*, p. 145. Chien discusses other such materials as well.

263. See Chien Yu-wen, *op. cit.*, pp. 133ff.

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CCL *Chao-chung lu照忠錄*(*Yueh ya-t'ang ts'ung-shu粵雅堂叢書*).

CHTC *Chiang-hsi t'ung-chih江西通志* (1975).

*CHYSC** Huang Shun黃佚享, *Ch'ung-hsiu yai-shan chih重修厓山志*(?).

CPL *Chao-pu lu招捕錄*(*Yuan wen-lei元文類*, 41).

*CSTP** *Chao-shih tsu-p'u趙氏族譜* (1937).

*EWPM** Ch'en Chung-wei陳仲偉, *Erh wang pen-mo二王本末* (?).

FCTC *Fu-chien t'ung-chi福建通紀* (1922).

*HAHC** *Hsin-an hsien chih新安縣志* (1820).

*HHHTC** *Hsin-hui hsiang-t'u chih新會鄉土志*(1899).

HTCTC Pi Yuan畢沅, *Hsü tz'u-chih t'ung-chien續資治通鑑*(1967).

HYS Ko Shao-min柯劭忞, *Hsin Yuan-shih新元史* (K'ai-ming開明 edition).

KCFC *Kuang-chou fu-chih廣州府志* (1880).

KTTC *Kuang-tung t'ung-chih廣東通志* (1865).

PSL *P'ing-sung lu平宋錄*(*Yuan wen-lei*, 41).

SS *Sung shih宋史* (Po-na pen).

*THHC** *Tung-huan hsien-chih東莞縣志* (1911).

WCHTFCIC Teng Kuang-chien 登光鑑, *Wen ch'eng-hsiang tu-fu chung-i ch'uan* 文丞相督府忠義傳 (*Wen wen-shan ch'üan-chi* 文文山全集, 1936).

WWSCC Wen T'ien-hsiang 文天祥, *Wen wen-shan ch'üan-chi* 文文山全集 (1936).

YCMCSL Su T'ien-chüeh 蘇天爵, *Yuan-ch'ao ming-ch'en shih-lüeh* 元朝名臣史略 (Ts'ung-shu chi ch'eng 叢書集成).

YS *Yuan shih* 元史, Chung-hua shu-chü 中華書局.

*YSC** *Yai-shan chi* 厓山集 (Han-fen lou pi-chi 涵芬樓秘笈).

YWL Su T'ien-chueh, editor, *Yuan Wen-lei* (1936).

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BOOK REVIEW

Corinne Hoexter. *From Canton to California: The Epic of Chinese Immigration*. New York: Four Winds Press, 1976, 281 pp. hardcover, $9.95.

This book is an attempt to fuse together narrative history and biography in order to review the many difficulties associated with the Chinese American past, while at the same time drawing attention to what the author perceives as its unnoticed or neglected aspects. The volume is divided into two equal and well-defined sections. Part I (130 pp.), "The Golden Magnet," is a chronicle of Chinese American history from the early 1850's, when large-scale Chinese immigration began, through the last decades of the nineteenth century, when the United States government enacted the exclusion laws. Part II (145 pp.), "Chew's Journey," is an introductory biography of Rev. Ng Poon Chew, a noted civic leader in San Francisco's Chinese community during the first three decades of this century.

The author states that her work was motivated by a wish to offer a portrait of a "Chinese Frederick Douglass," as one aspect of her research into "the role of [ethnic] minorities and immigrants in American history" (pp. vii-viii). The book's organization is simple and the writing is clear and straightforward. Given the small body of literature on Chinese American history, and the fact that this particular work is directed at a large audience from "the seventh grade and up" (*Books in Print 1980-1981*, p. 1552), then it is possible to say that Hoexter's work will provide worthwhile reading for many. I would caution, however, that this should not be regarded as a positive endorsement of this book.

In general, I have found *From Canton to California* a great disappointment. The subject of study and the format adopted by the author were potentially capable of educating us about the Chinese American past. This potential is not fulfilled because the book offers little new information (other than the details of Ng Poon Chew's life) nor does it offer any new perspective on the Chinese in America. Research is confined mainly to English language secondary sources. With the exception of infrequent references to *Chung Sai Yat Bo*, Chinese sources are neglected. The book remains content with presenting an interesting and entertaining story. Although it has an impressive title and a smooth flowing text, it can only result in disappointment to all but the totally uninformed reader.

In response to the paucity of works on Chinese American history, especially scholarly ones, there has developed a tendency among some to seize upon recent offerings and ascribe to them positive characteristics and functions. Unfortunately, only a few merit such treatment. *From Canton to California* is a case where such ascription is clearly misplaced. It seems useful to scrutinize more responsibly how a given work does or does not inform us about what it claims to investigate. Success or failure at this task should be the ultimate test of its value as a new offering in Chinese American history.

This book is flawed in several areas. These include: 1) inadequate and